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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
CONSTRUCTING SECURE MAPREDUCE FRAMEWORK IN CLOUD-BASED 
ENVIRONMENT 
by 
Yongzhi Wang 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Jinpeng Wei, Major Professor 
MapReduce, a parallel computing paradigm, has been gaining popularity in recent years 
as cloud vendors offer MapReduce computation services on their public clouds. However, 
companies are still reluctant to move their computations to the public cloud due to the 
following reason: In the current business model, the entire MapReduce cluster is deployed 
on the public cloud. If the public cloud is not properly protected, the integrity and the 
confidentiality of MapReduce applications can be compromised by attacks inside or 
outside of the public cloud. From the result integrity’s perspective, if any computation 
nodes on the public cloud are compromised, those nodes can return incorrect task results 
and therefore render the final job result inaccurate. From the algorithmic confidentiality’s 
perspective, when more and more companies devise innovative algorithms and deploy 
them to the public cloud, malicious attackers can reverse engineer those programs to detect 
the algorithmic details and, therefore, compromise the intellectual property of those 
companies. 
In this dissertation, we propose to use the hybrid cloud architecture to defeat the above 
two threats. Based on the hybrid cloud architecture, we propose separate solutions to 
 vii 
address the result integrity and the algorithmic confidentiality problems. To address the 
result integrity problem, we propose the Integrity Assurance MapReduce (IAMR) 
framework. IAMR performs the result checking technique to guarantee high result 
accuracy of MapReduce jobs, even if the computation is executed on an untrusted public 
cloud. We implemented a prototype system for a real hybrid cloud environment and 
performed a series of experiments. Our theoretical simulations and experimental results 
show that IAMR can guarantee a very low job error rate, while maintaining a moderate 
performance overhead. To address the algorithmic confidentiality problem, we focus on 
the program control flow and propose the Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce (CAMR) 
framework. CAMR performs the Runtime Control Flow Obfuscation (RCFO) technique to 
protect the predicates of MapReduce jobs. We implemented a prototype system for a real 
hybrid cloud environment. The security analysis and experimental results show that 
CAMR defeats static analysis-based reverse engineering attacks, raises the bar for the 
dynamic analysis-based reverse engineering attacks, and incurs a modest performance 
overhead. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and Contribution 
Big Data becomes a buzzword in recent years when sizes of computing jobs scale up 
rapidly. The traditional computing model can no longer satisfy the speed requirement of 
such large-scale jobs. One direction to address such a challenge is to process computing 
jobs in a parallel approach. MapReduce is a generalized parallel computing paradigm that 
is widely used in various applications, including web search engine, geo-informatics 
system, and so on. MapReduce applications normally are deployed to a cluster consisting 
of hundreds or thousands of computation nodes to achieve high parallelism. However, 
most MapReduce customers cannot afford or do not want to invest in computer clusters of 
such a large scale. The emergence of Cloud Computing provides an economical alternative 
for those users to deploy arbitrary large-scale clusters on demand. With the public cloud, 
MapReduce users can deploy virtualized clusters on the public cloud based on their 
demands. They only need to pay the cloud vendor based on the resources they used. Such a 
new model not only reduces users’ IT infrastructure cost, but also boost their 
productivities. 
Today, many cloud vendors are offering MapReduce computation services (e.g., 
Amazon Elastic MapReduce (EMR) and Microsoft Daytona) on their public clouds. 
However, a lot of companies or individuals are still reluctant to move their computations to 
the cloud due to security concerns. Indeed, those worries are necessary. For instance, [1] 
pointed out a security vulnerability that Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) suffers 
from: some members of the EC2 community can create and upload malicious Amazon 
Machine Images (AMIs), which, if widely used, can flood the EC2 cloud with malicious 
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virtual machines that contain compromised applications, including MapReduce. Even 
worse, since the cloud service is opaque to the cloud user, the service providers and the 
government authorities might abuse their privileges to violate the security guarantee of the 
public cloud without notifying the cloud customer. For example, the 2013 global 
surveillance disclosure [18] revealed that the National Security Agency of the US 
government spies on the online activities of the Internet users with or without the 
knowledge of Internet corporations. Under such a situation, a service that can outsource 
computation without outsourcing security is needed to earn customers’ confidences. 
 The above vulnerabilities exist due to the reason that the entire service is deployed to the 
public cloud. In the case of MapReduce computing, the entire computation is performed on 
the public cloud. If the computation node in the public cloud is compromised, the 
computation integrity and the confidentiality can be compromised. In this dissertation, we 
specifically explore the following two security problems. 
1. The result integrity problem.  
The MapReduce job is usually executed on a cluster, which consists of a number 
of computing nodes. The task result of each node will contribute to the accuracy 
of the final job result. If any computation node on the public cloud is 
compromised, this node can return incorrect task results and therefore render the 
final job result inaccurate. In this situation, a solution is needed to protect the 
integrity of task results and the entire job result. 
2. The algorithmic confidentiality problem.  
Nowadays, more and more companies are devising their innovative algorithms to 
provide various information services, including business analytics, geospatial 
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mapping/searching, bioinformatics analysis, image processing, etc. When those 
companies deploy their services to the public cloud [33][34][35][36], they hope 
that the algorithms in their services are not revealed to others, especially to their 
business competitors. However, if the hacker is able to compromise the public 
cloud, the hacker can perform reverse engineering attacks on the company’s 
program to find out its algorithmic details. By doing so, the hacker can offer a 
similar service with the same level of service quality. Under this situation, a 
solution is needed to protect the confidentiality of the algorithm details in the 
outsourced program. 
In this dissertation, we propose to use a unified architecture, the hybrid cloud 
architecture, to address the above two problems. The hybrid cloud architecture consist of a 
trusted private cloud and an untrusted public cloud. The intuition of our solution is as 
follows. Since the private cloud is trusted, we can leverage its trustworthiness to obtain the 
control of the computation; meanwhile, we utilize the public cloud to perform the majority 
of computations. Since the private cloud can be deployed in users’ premises, users control 
the security. 
Based on the hybrid cloud architecture, we propose separate solutions to address the 
result integrity problem and the algorithmic confidentiality problem. To address the result 
integrity problem, we propose a novel MapReduce framework, called Integrity Assurance 
MapReduce (IAMR). IAMR can guarantee high result integrity of MapReduce 
computations, even if the computation is executed on a public cloud that contains 
malicious computing nodes. IAMR overlays MapReduce computations on the hybrid 
cloud. It performs a proposed high accuracy assurance scheme called the result checking 
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technique to assure high result integrity of MapReduce computations. The result checking 
technique performs probabilistic task replication on the public cloud, performs 
probabilistic task verification on the private cloud, and maintains trust management for 
each worker to ensure the participating computing node are benign.  
Our theoretical analysis shows that IAMR can guarantee a very low job error rate. For 
example, when we set the batch size as 50 and the replication probability as 0.5, we can 
guarantee less than 1% of job error rate when half of workers on the public cloud are 
malicious. Based on our theoretical analysis, we model the IAMR and the attacker as a 
two-player zero sum game and propose two algorithms to search for optimal parameter 
values for IAMR: Interactive Gradient Descent (IGD) algorithm and Tiered Interactive 
Gradient Descent (TIGD) algorithm. The IGD algorithm can find the parameter settings 
for IAMR based on the user’s accuracy requirement. The TIGD algorithm can find the 
parameter settings not only based on the user’s accuracy requirement, but also on user’s 
system restriction settings.  
We implemented a prototype system that caters to a real hybrid cloud environment (a 
hybrid cloud consisting of a local private cloud and Amazon public cloud1) and performed 
a series of experiments to evaluate its performance. Our experimental results show that 
IAMR can guarantee a very low job error rate and maintain a moderate performance 
overhead. For instance, it introduces 19% to 83% of delay in the map phase depending on 
the replication probability, and 29% of delay in the reduce phase. 
In order to address the algorithmic confidentiality problem, we propose the 
Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce (CAMR) platform. CAMR performs a novel control 
 
1 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ 
  5
flow obfuscation technique called Runtime Control Flow Obfuscation (RCFO) on 
outsourced MapReduce jobs to hide information on program predicates and complicate the 
control flow graph. RCFO transforms each original MapReduce job program into two 
programs: the public program and the private program. The private program is executed on 
the trusted private cloud. It maintains the information of program predicates and 
determines the runtime control flow. The public program executes the majority 
computation on the public cloud, but it needs to query the private program to determine the 
runtime control flow. In order to further protect the control flow, RCFO also performs the 
fake branch statements insertion method, the CFQ function encryption scheme and the 
loop transformation technique to further raise the bar for reverse engineering attacks. To 
reduce the performance overhead, RCFO maintains a continuous cache to reduce the 
cross-cloud communication.  
We developed a prototype system that caters to a real hybrid cloud environment (a 
hybrid cloud consisting of a local private cloud and Amazon EMR2). Our prototype system 
can automatically apply RCFO on MapReduce job programs and run the obfuscated job on 
the hybrid cloud environment. Our experimental results show that the average performance 
overhead ranges from 14.9% to 33.2% when the obfuscation degree increases from 0 to 
1.0. 
We declare that our solutions in this dissertation are not only restricted to MapReduce 
itself. Since MapReduce represents a wide class of outsourced computing paradigms, our 
solutions can be applied to a wide range of outsourced computing scenarios without major 
modification. The detailed discussion will be performed in Chapter 5. 
 
2 Amazon Elastic MapReduce (EMR), http://aws.amazon.com/elasticmapreduce/ 
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1.2 Outline 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the background 
knowledge involved in this dissertation. Chapter 3 presents the motivation, assumption, 
design details, experimental results, and the related work of the IAMR framework. Chapter 
4 presents the motivation, assumption, design details, implementation details, 
experimental results, and the related work of CAMR framework. Chapter 5 discusses the 
generalization of our solutions to other outsourced computing scenarios. Chapter 6 makes 
the conclusion of this dissertation. 
1.3 Publications 
Based on our works in this dissertation, we published the following papers in 
peer-reviewed journals and conferences: 
• Yongzhi Wang, Jinpeng Wei, "Toward Protecting Control Flow Confidentiality in 
Cloud-based Computation", Elsevier Journal of Computers and Security. Volume 
52, pp. 106-127, July 2015. Doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2015.04.005. 
• Yongzhi Wang, Jinpeng Wei, Yucong Duan "Securing MapReduce Result 
Integrity via Verification-based Integrity Assurance Framework". International 
Journal of Grid and Distributed Computing (IJGDC). Vol. 7, No. 6 (2014), 
pp.53-70 
• Yongzhi Wang, Jinpeng Wei, Mudhakar Srivatsa "Cross Cloud MapReduce: A 
Result Integrity Check Framework on Hybrid Clouds". International Journal of 
Cloud Computing (IJCC), Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013. 
• Yongzhi Wang, Jinpeng Wei, Mudhakar Srivatsa, Yucong Duan, and Wencai Du. 
"IntegrityMR: Integrity Assurance Framework for Big Data Analytics and 
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Management Applications". The First International Workshop on Knowledge 
Management and Big Data Analytics (KMBA), Oct 6 - 9, 2013, Santa Clara, CA, 
USA. 
• Yongzhi Wang, Jinpeng Wei, and Mudhakar Srivatsa. "Result Integrity Check for 
MapReduce Computation on Hybrid Clouds". The 6th IEEE International 
Conference on Cloud Computing (IEEE CLOUD 2013), June 27 - July 2, 2013, 
Santa Clara, CA. 
• Yongzhi Wang, Jinpeng Wei, Mudhakar Srivatsa. "Cross Cloud MapReduce: an 
Uncheatable MapReduce". The 33rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 
(IEEE S&P), San Francisco, CA, May 20-23, 2012. Poster paper. 
• Yongzhi Wang, Jinpeng Wei. "VIAF: Verification-based Integrity Assurance 
Framework for MapReduce". The Fourth IEEE International Conference on Cloud 
Computing (CLOUD 2011), July 4-9, 2011, Washington DC. 
2 PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE 
In this chapter, we introduce the background knowledge involved in this dissertation. 
Specifically, we will briefly introduce MapReduce and discuss basic concepts about 
software obfuscation. 
2.1 MapReduce 
MapReduce [5] is a parallel programming model for large-scale dataset processing. It 
usually has been implemented as a distributed system deployed on a cluster. In MapReduce, 
each computation request issued by the user is called a job. Each job is usually broken 
down into several tasks. The traditional architecture of MapReduce consists of one master 
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and a number of workers. The master controls the entire computation by managing jobs, 
scheduling tasks, and maintaining load balance, etc. Workers are hosts that contribute 
computation resources to execute tasks assigned by the master. In MapReduce, data are 
stored in the Distributed File System (DFS). Each job usually retrieves input data from the 
DFS and stored the result back to DFS when the job is finished. 
Each MapReduce job consists of two consecutive phases: the map phase and the reduce 
phase. The workers executing tasks in the map phase are called mappers. The tasks 
executed in the map phase are called map tasks. The workers executing tasks in the reduce 
phase are called reducers. The tasks executed in the reduce phase are called reduce tasks. 
In the map phase, the input data are fetched from the DFS and are divided into several 
chunks. Each data chunk will be assigned to one map task and processed independently. 
Each map task result consists of a collection of tuples with the format of <key, value>. The 
tuples in each task result are sorted by key. Each task result is stored in its worker’s local 
storage, and will be used as input in the reduce phase. In the reduce phase, each reduce task 
only processes the map task output tuples with certain keys. Therefore a special function 
called partition determines to which reduce task a map task output tuple should be assigned 
based on the content of the “key” in that tuple. Such a process is called shuffle. After the 
shuffle process, each reduce task will execute the reduce function to aggregate assigned 
tuples and generate the job output. 
Figure 1 shows the workflow of a MapReduce application, Word Count. Word Count 
computes the number of occurrences of each word in the provided input text files. In the 
example, the input data are stored in the DFS and are broken down into three chucks. Each 
chuck is sent to a mapper (M1, M2 or M3). Each map task computes the occurrence of each 
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input chuck and stores the result in its local storage. After that, the map task output goes 
through the shuffle function partition and sends the tuples with key “Hello” to reducer R1 
and sends other tuples to reducer R2. Each reduce task aggregates tuples with the same key 
(i.e., accumulate the occurrences of each distinct key) and outputs its result tuples into DFS. 
The generated result indicates the occurrences of each word in the input text files. 
 
Figure 1 MapReduce Example: Word Count 
MapReduce is usually deployed on a computer cluster in order to process computing 
tasks in a parallel manner. However, many users such as small companies and individuals 
do not want to or cannot afford investing a dedicated cluster to process MapReduce jobs. 
Fortunately, public cloud vendors offer services that enable users to set up virtualized 
clusters on demand and execute their MapReduce jobs on those clusters. As a return, the 
cloud vendor charges the cloud user based on the cluster size and the use time. 
 For example, Amazon EC2 and Windows Azure allow users to rent virtualized 
computers and run their applications on it. By using such a service, a MapReduce user can 
set up her own cluster based on the computation size and pay the fee only based on the 
resources she uses. Such a service still requires the cloud user to setup a cluster. Cloud 
vendors also offer MapReduce computing services (e.g., Amazon Elastic MapReduce), 
Hello World
Goodbye World
Hello Hadoop
<Hello , 1>
<World , 1>
<Hadoop , 1>
<Hello , 1>
<Goodbye , 1>
<World , 1>
Partition(key){
  if(key=="Hello")
    assign to R1;
  else
    assgin to R2;
}
M1
M2
M3
R1
R2
Map Phase
Shuffle
Reduce Phase
Hello, 2
Hadoop, 1
Goodbye, 1
World, 2
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which automatically set up MapReduce clusters based on user’s requirement. With such 
services, users do not have to setup cluster by themselves. They only need to upload their 
jobs and data to the public cloud and initiate the computation. The cloud service will take 
care of other details. 
2.2 Software Obfuscation 
Software Obfuscation generally refers to a process of transforming a program P through 
an obfuscator O into a program O(P) such that O(P) has the equivalent functionality of P 
(correctness), is resilient against a reverse engineering attack (resilience) and is not 
significantly slower than P (efficiency). Collberg et al. [17] classify obfuscation methods 
into three categories: lexical obfuscation, data obfuscation and control flow obfuscation. 
Lexical obfuscation typically scrambles the program identifiers to confuse the attacker. 
Data obfuscation modifies the data structure to hide the information. Control flow 
obfuscation transforms the program to make the control flow unintelligible. Because 
control flow obfuscation is the most direct way of protecting the confidentiality of the 
program algorithm, in this dissertation, we explore that direction to protect the algorithmic 
confidentiality. 
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3 INTEGRITY ASSURANCE MAPREDUCE 
In this chapter, we present the design of the Integrity Assurance MapReduce. We start 
with the system motivation. Following the motivation, we describe our system architecture 
and the design overview, define the system assumption and the attacker model, present the 
design details, and perform the theoretical analysis. Based on the theoretical analysis result, 
we present algorithms to search for the optimal system parameter values. We present the 
experimental results and discuss the related work in the last part of this chapter. 
3.1 System Motivation 
MapReduce usually requires to be deployed to a large computer cluster. Since many 
small companies or individuals cannot afford or do not want to invest in computer clusters 
of such a large scale, they usually will choose to outsource their computation to public 
computing service platforms such as Volunteer Computing [45][37] and Cloud Computing 
[38][39]. Volunteer Computing platforms have long been blamed as unaccountable due to 
the existence of malicious nodes [40][41]. Cloud Computing platforms have better security 
guarantee than volunteer computing platforms. However, it is still possible for a skillful 
hacker to breach the security of commercial clouds. For instance, [42] pointed out a 
security vulnerability that Amazon EC2 suffers from: some members of the Amazon EC2 
community can create and upload malicious Amazon Machine Images which, if widely 
used, can flood the community with hundreds of infected virtual machine instances. Along 
the same line, Bugiel et al. [2] perform a systematic study of the security status of public 
AMIs and report various vulnerabilities of Amazon EC2. 
The above threats put MapReduce customers in a dilemma: using public clouds has 
economic advantage but incurs the risk of getting incorrect computation results; on the 
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other hand, avoiding the public cloud completely (i.e., running everything “in house” or in 
the private cloud) can guarantee result accuracy, but there will be less economic benefit. 
Under this situation, an economical solution that can guarantee high result integrity is 
needed. 
3.2 System Architecture and Design Overview 
Based on the above motivations, we propose the Integrity Assurance MapReduce 
(IAMR). IAMR employs a hybrid cloud architecture, which consists of a private cloud and 
a public cloud. The master that is in control of the entire computation runs on a private 
cloud. Workers run on the untrusted public cloud. Since the public cloud is untrusted, the 
workers deployed to it can be malicious. We introduce a special type of workers, called 
verifiers, and deploy them on the private cloud. The verifier is trusted. It can be used to 
detect malicious workers on the public cloud. The key rationale of our solution is to retain 
control and the trust “at home”, while delegating the more resource-intensive computations 
to the public cloud. Since our research focuses on the integrity of computation, we assume 
the DFS is trusted. Therefore, we deploy the DFS on the public cloud (See Section 3.3) to 
reduce cross-cloud data transmission. The architecture of IAMR is shown in Figure 2. 
Based on this architecture, we leverage the trustworthiness of the master and the verifiers 
to propose the result checking technique to enhance the result integrity. The result 
checking technique performs probabilistic task replication on the public cloud, performs 
probabilistic task verification on the private cloud, and maintains a trust management 
mechanism for each worker to distinguish malicious workers from benign workers. Due to 
the different characteristics of the map phase and the reduce phase, IAMR performs the 
result checking technique on different objects. In the map phase, the technique is 
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performed on map tasks. In the reduce phase, IAMR factors each reduce task into multiple 
sub-tasks and applies the technique on sub-tasks. 
 
Figure 2 The Architecture of Integrity Assurance MapReduce 
3.3 System Assumption and the Attacker Model  
3.3.1 System Assumption 
We make the following assumptions based on our proposed architecture. We assume that 
the private cloud is deployed within the user’s organization, and thus is trusted. In other 
words, the master and the verifiers are trusted. On the public cloud, we assume the 
infrastructure provided by the cloud provider, such as the virtualized hardware and the 
network, is trusted. However, we assume virtual images used by the cloud user are 
untrusted. That makes the workers running on the public cloud untrusted. Since our system 
only focuses on the MapReduce computation, we assume the Distributed File System (DFS) 
is trusted. For example, the integrity of DFS can be guaranteed by the storage integrity 
assurance techniques, such as [3] and [4]. 
In IAMR, the master requires that each worker who runs a task/sub-task to submit the 
hash value of the task/sub-task result to the master. We assume the submitted hash value to 
be consistent with the actual task/sub-task output. Such an assumption can be realized by 
applying the commitment-based protocol proposed in [8] (i.e., the previous worker 
commits the task output to the master by the hash value. The later worker who takes the 
previous task’s output as input will calculate the hash value of input, and send the 
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calculated hash value to the master. The master compares the two hash values to ensure the 
previous worker does not lie).  
Finally, we assume that the MapReduce job has the following properties: 
Property 1. The tasks/sub-tasks of that job should be deterministic. In other words, 
multiple executions of the same task/sub-task by honest workers should return the 
same result. 
Property 2. The job should be big enough so that it will be broken down into a big number 
of tasks. For those jobs, each task’s result should equally contribute to the entire job’s 
result. We also assume that accepting a small number of incorrect task results should 
only affect the job’s precision, without affecting its correctness. Therefore, the portion 
of tasks that return correct results determines the precision of a job result. 
We argue that Property 2 is a reasonable assumption. Firstly, one primary reason for the 
cloud user to use public clouds is that the computation workload is significantly large. 
Otherwise, the user would perform the computation locally. Secondly, high parallelism is a 
necessary factor to address the challenge of computing load scaling up. In parallel 
computations, each task result usually is equally important to the job result. In fact, such 
classes of jobs widely exist in the field of statistics, machine learning, and data mining. For 
some computations whose accuracy can be affected by any incorrect task results, that 
computation usually can be broken down into multiple jobs. For the jobs whose accuracy is 
not sensitive, we can perform our proposed solution on those jobs. For other jobs, we can 
compute the job on the trusted private cloud. For example, some big data analytics 
computation is performed in a chain of MapReduce jobs (e.g., Apache Pig3, Apache 
 
3 http://pig.apache.org 
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Mahout4, etc.). Our solution can be applied to the jobs that satisfy Property 2. For jobs that 
do not satisfy Property 2, we can compute those jobs on the private cloud directly. 
3.3.2 Attacker Model 
We model the attacker as an intelligent adversary that controls the malicious nodes on 
the public cloud. It receives and correlates information collected by malicious nodes and 
coordinates them to cheat at the best time in order to introduce as many errors as possible to 
the final result without being detected. For example, if the master replicates the same task 
on two malicious workers, the adversary can instruct them to return the same erroneous 
results (i.e., to collude), so that simply comparing the results cannot detect that error. We 
call such malicious workers collusive workers.  
3.4 System Design 
In both the map phase and the reduce phase, IAMR defines three types of tasks: the 
original task, the replication task, and the verification task. The original task and the 
replication task are executed on the public cloud. The verification task is executed in the 
verifier on the private cloud. The replication task repeats the original task’s work to 
validate the original task’s result. Since replication tasks are executed on untrusted workers, 
the verification tasks are launched non-deterministically to verify replication tasks’ results 
in order to detect collusive workers. 
In the map phase, the replication and verification task completely repeat the original map 
task’s work. In the reduce phase, each original reduce task is broken down into a number of 
small parts (see Section 3.4.2). Each replication/verification reduce task repeats only one 
part of the original reduce task. Each part of a reduce task is called a sub-task. In both the 
 
4 http://mahout.apache.org/ 
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Map phase and the Reduce phase, IAMR performs a probabilistic two-layer check 
technique on each returned original task/sub-task result. Specifically, IAMR performs 
probabilistic task replications on the public cloud and performs probabilistic task 
verifications on the private cloud. In addition, IAMR maintains trust management for each 
worker. The master only accepts a worker’s task/sub-task results in a batch when all the 
tasks/sub-tasks in that batch do not fail on probabilistic two-layer checks. 
The task/sub-task assignment in IAMR differs from the original MapReduce. Rather 
than passively waiting for the worker to ask for task/sub-task, the master of IAMR 
randomly selects a worker to assign a certain task/sub-task. When a worker finishes its 
assigned task/sub-task, IAMR requires the worker to return the result. In order to reduce 
the communication cost, the worker only returns the result’s hash value to the master. 
Since the replication task and the verification task are only used to evaluate their original 
task’s correctness, the actual result of the replication/verification task/sub-tasks will not be 
stored back to the DFS. 
Since map and reduce phases have different characteristics (i.e., some jobs may contain a 
small number of reduce tasks. Yet each reduce task contains a significant workload), we 
propose different designs for the two phases. We present the system design for the map 
phase in Section 3.4.1 and the design for the reduce phase in Section 3.4.2. 
3.4.1 Map Phase Integrity Check 
IAMR applies the two-layer check on each returned map task result. In the first-layer, 
IAMR creates a replication task and assigns the task to another randomly selected worker. 
The replication task is assigned with a rule called hold-and-test. The hold-and-test rule is 
that a replicated task can be assigned to a worker only when the master receives its original 
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task result. By doing so, even if an original task is assigned to a malicious worker, the 
malicious worker cannot safely commit a cheat. This is because by the time the malicious 
worker receives a task, it cannot tell whether a replicated task corresponding to the 
assigned task will be generated, and whether this replicated task will be assigned to another 
collusive worker. If that malicious worker cheats and a replicated task is generated and 
assigned to a benign worker, the cheat will be detected (For the detailed analysis of the 
hold-and-test technique, please refer to Section 3.5.1). When a worker returns the 
replication task result, IAMR compares the original task result with the replication task 
result. If the two results are not consistent, at least one of the two workers is cheating. 
IAMR will generate a verification task and assign it to a verifier to determine the malicious 
worker(s). If the two results are consistent, IAMR will perform the second-layer check. In 
the second-layer check, IAMR creates a verification task and assigns it to a verifier to 
verify the consistent results. If the consistent results are different from the verification task 
result, we know that the two mappers are both malicious. The goal of the second-layer 
check is to detect collusive workers.  
Performing two-layer check on each task will incur significant performance overhead. 
To reduce the overhead, IAMR creates the replication task and the verification task with a 
certain probability. Specifically, for each original map task, IAMR creates the replication 
task with a replication probability, and creates a verification task with a verification 
probability. 
Since the two-layer check is performed in a probabilistic manner, there is a possibility 
that some incorrect results can evade the check. In order to overcome this drawback, IAMR 
performs a trust management technique to improve the job accuracy. The idea is that the 
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master performs the probabilistic two-layer check on each mapper for a period of time. The 
master accepts a mapper’s original task results in a batch when that mapper did not fail any 
two-layer check during that period. The number of original tasks on which the master 
performs the probabilistic two-layer check before accepting their results is called the batch 
size. Notice that since the two-layer check is performed in a probabilistic manner, the 
original task that is not replicated or verified is also counted for the batch size. However, 
the replicated task will not be counted. The intuition of this mechanism is that observing a 
mapper for a longer period without detecting misbehave gives the master more confidence 
that the mapper is benign.  
In order to achieve the above mechanism, the master maintains a history cache for each 
mapper to record the original tasks (not the replicated task) that this mapper has completed 
and passed the probabilistic two-layer check. Specifically, the history cache for each 
mapper records the task id and the hash value of the task results of the original map tasks 
that mapper has computed. Note that the actual task result is buffered in the mapper’s local 
storage. When a mapper accumulates batch size of tasks in its history cache without failing 
any two-layer check, the mapper becomes trusted temporarily. The master thus accepts all 
the task results buffered in the mapper’s local storage and empty its history cache. After 
that, this mapper becomes untrusted again. The mapper has to accumulate another batch 
size of tasks on its history cache without failing the two-layer check in order to submit the 
next batch results to the master. If a mapper fails any two-layer check before submitting 
batch size of tasks, the mapper is determined to be malicious and is added to a black list. 
Meanwhile, the task results buffered in this mapper’s local storage are discarded, and the 
corresponding tasks cached in the history cache will be rescheduled. 
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Figure 3 presents the workflow of IAMR. In this figure, W1 and W2 are two workers 
randomly chosen from the public cloud. The “Arbitrate/Verify task” step is a step executed 
by the verifier on the private cloud. The remaining components in the figure are all 
performed on the master. Notice that in this figure, IAMR applies the hold-and-test rule to 
assign the original and the replicated tasks: the “replication” decision (step 3) is made after 
W1 returns the original task result R2 (step 2). This assignment sequence makes it difficult 
for malicious workers to collude because they cannot predict whether the replication task 
will be assigned to another collusive worker. A detailed discussion about this rule is 
presented in Section 3.5.1. 
 
Figure 3 The Workflow of Integrity Assurance MapReduce 
If the total number of original map tasks in a job is less than the batch size, IAMR will 
directly assign all tasks to verifiers, since no mapper can accumulate batch size of tasks in 
its history cache and thus guarantee expected accuracy. This will not incur significant 
workload to the verifier if the batch size is a reasonable number. Meanwhile, the accuracy 
is still guaranteed. If the number of the original map tasks is large enough, a higher batch 
size will guarantee a higher accuracy, as shown in our simulation in Section 3.5.2. 
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3.4.2 Reduce Phase Integrity Check 
In the reduce phase, the approach presented in Section 3.4.1 can be directly applied only 
if the number of reduce tasks is large enough (i.e., bigger than the batch size). However, in 
some applications, the reduce task number is smaller than the batch size, even though the 
computing workload for each reduce task is significant. For instance, the word count 
application with the default partition function contains only one original reduce task. 
However, this single task will process intermediate results generated from each map task, 
which can be a heavy workload. For example, our experiments showed that in a word count 
job processing a file with 628 Megabyte of text, the single reduce task will process 2.7M of 
records (1.07GB of data) in the input and generate 598K of records in the output, and take 
262 seconds to complete. In this case, directly verifying the entire reduce task is expensive 
in terms of computation and communication cost. Therefore, we propose to break down 
each original reduce task into many sub-tasks and apply the two-layer check technique on 
each sub-task. We present the technical details in Section 3.4.2.1. Based on the basic 
reduce phase integrity check technique, we present the request bucketing technique in 
Section 3.4.2.2 to limit the sub-task number into a small value without sacrificing the result 
accuracy. 
 Break Down Reduce Tasks into Sub-tasks 
Our reduce phase integrity check design is based on the following intuition. Remember 
that each record in MapReduce computation is in a format of <key, value> tuple. We 
observe that both the map task and the reduce task outputs are sorted by key. For each key 
in the reduce output, if we can precisely pinpoint the map output tuples that are related to 
that key, we can reproduce the portion of the reduce task that is related to that key. We call 
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each portion of reduce task as sub-task. Therefore, each original reduce task can be divided 
into multiple sub-tasks, each of which is related to one key. By applying two-layer check to 
each sub-task, we can guarantee high accuracy of the original reduce task. Here, we 
temporarily define each sub-task to cover one key. We will extend this concept later for 
practicality reason. 
Our reduce phase integrity check uses the same high-level ideas as the map phase. Each 
original sub-task returns its result to the master in the form of a hash value (we call each 
returned sub-task result as a report). The master applies the first-layer (i.e., replication) and 
second-layer (i.e., verification) check on each report with replication probability and 
verification probability, respectively. The generation of a replication sub-task is decided 
after the report of an original sub-task is returned to the master (i.e., hold-and-test). We 
regulate that an original reduce task result is accepted by the master only when all its 
sub-tasks pass the probabilistic two-layer check, which is essentially a trust management 
mechanism. The batch size is therefore the number of sub-tasks in the original reduce task. 
If the number of sub-tasks in an original reduce task is smaller than the batch size, IAMR 
directly generates a verification reduce task to verify the entire original reduce task. 
The above idea only works conceptually. In order to make it practical, we need to extend 
the concept of sub-tasks and reports, and overcome the following three challenges. 
1) Creating a sub-task for each key would incur significant overhead. It is because in 
many cases, the amount of keys in a reduce task can be huge (e.g., a word count job 
with 628 Mega bytes of input text file will generate more than 598,000 keys).  
2) The accuracy only relies on the two-layer checks of the sub-task reports submitted 
by the reducer. If a malicious reducer cheats on some sub-tasks but does not send 
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these reports to the master, the master would have no way to detect the error.  
3) The replication and verification sub-tasks should efficiently locate the portion of 
map task output with the key they are interested in.  
We address the first challenge by extending the concept of report and sub-task to cover a 
range of consecutive keys, instead of just one key. With this improvement, the number of 
sub-tasks will be reduced.  
For the second challenge, IAMR requires that consecutive reports in the original reduce 
task must overlap in one key. In addition, the first and last report in each original reduce 
task should cover the first and the last key of the task output, respectively. The master will 
check those requirements when it receives reports. Since the reduce task result is sorted by 
key, this requirement ensures that no key in the output is skipped in the reports. In case that 
the master does not know the first and the last key in the original reduce task output, the 
master can insert dummy records in the job input data, which will generate reduce result 
tuples with predictable smallest and largest keys. For instance, when the type of the key in 
a job is integer, the master can insert special records with their keys as 
Integer.MIN_VALUE and Integer.MAX_VALUE, respectively. When the reduce task is 
complete, the job output can be sanitized by removing the output records related to those 
dummy input records. 
For the third challenge, each map task in IAMR builds a key table to facilitate the record 
look up in the map task output, as shown in Figure 4. When a sub-task wants to fetch the 
map output within a certain key range (e.g., Key 2 to Key 9) from the map task output file, 
it will locate the position through the key table of that task. In the original MapReduce, 
each map task stores the map output file locally, which consists of key-value pairs sorted 
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by key. Usually, the lengths of keys and values vary. Notice that multiple key-value pairs 
can have the same key (e.g., Key 3). For brevity, we call consecutive key-value pairs in the 
map output file with the same key as a block. Each record in the key table corresponds to a 
block in the map output file. It has three fields, indicating the start position of the block, the 
length of the key, and the length of the block. Since the lengths of keys and values vary, 
each access to a key on the map output file needs to go through the key table, which has the 
fixed record length. The key table records are sorted by key, IAMR can apply binary search 
to look up the records within the request key range. However, each key comparison in the 
binary search needs to fetch the key in the map output file through the key table. When the 
binary search finds the keys (e.g., Key 3 through Key 8) between the request range (e.g., 
Key 2 to Key 9), the key position and the record length direct the reducer to fetch the 
portion of map output.  
Since it is the mapper who creates the key table, a malicious mapper can manipulate the 
content in its key table to fool IAMR. As a defense, IAMR requires each map task to 
submit the hash value of its key table to the master along with that of task result. Therefore 
the key table has the same accuracy as the map task result. The consistency between the 
hash value and the actual key table can be guaranteed by the commitment-based protocol 
[8]. 
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Figure 4 Locating Map Output Between Key 2 and Key 9 using Key Table 
Figure 5 shows the workflow of IAMR in the reduce phase when executing the word 
count application. Remember the word count application calculates the frequency of each 
word appeared in a collection of text files. For simplicity, our example only has two map 
tasks (map 0 and map 1) and one original reduce task (reduce 0). As Figure 5 shows, each 
map task creates a key table (Step 1). When the original reduce task (reduce 0) starts to 
output (step 3), sub-task reports (e.g., Report 1 and Report 2) are sent to the master 
sequentially. The report format is <start key, end key, hash value of the output records 
covered in the key range> (Step 4). Since consecutive reports must overlap in one key 
(According to the solution of challenge 2), the key “Driver” appears in both report 1 and 
report 2. When the master receives report 1 (Step 5), it launches the first-layer check by 
initiating a replication sub-task (with replication probability). The replication sub-task 
fetches input with a key range of (Apple, Driver) from each map task (map 0 and map 1) 
through key tables (Step 7). When it completes reducing (Step 8), the replication sub-task 
sends a report to the master (Step 9), and the master compares the report with the original 
sub-task report (Step 10). If they are consistent, a second-layer check is performed to verify 
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the consistent results. The verification sub-task will be created if necessary (Step 11). 
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Figure 5 Workflow of IAMR in the Reduce Phase 
 Request Bucketing to Reduce Sub-task Number 
One drawback of reduce phase design in Section 3.4.2.1 is that in order to achieve high 
accuracy, IAMR will generate a large number of sub-tasks. Each sub-task will be executed 
as an individual reduce task. Such a reduce task needs to connect to each map tasks, locate 
the map output position, and fetch only a small portion of data. In addition, setting up and 
tearing down each sub-task consume a certain amount of resource. As a result, a big 
number of sub-tasks can introduce a big performance delay. We propose the request 
bucketing technique to merge multiple sub-tasks into one reduce task to improve 
performance, without sacrificing the accuracy.  
The idea of request bucketing is as follows. We create several replication buckets ready 
to receive replication sub-task requests. Each bucket has a limited capacity. Whenever the 
master receives a sub-task report from original reduce task and decides to generate a 
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replication sub-task (first-layer check), instead of generating a reduce task just for that 
single sub-task, the master randomly chooses a bucket and stores the sub-task request to 
this bucket. When a bucket achieves its capacity, the master generates a replication reduce 
task to compute all the sub-task requests in that bucket. Meanwhile, the bucket is emptied. 
The master will randomly choose a worker to execute this replication task. The replication 
task will send multiple replication sub-task reports back to the master, each of which will 
correspond to one original sub-task report. When a report passes the first-layer check, the 
master will apply the second-layer check to those sub-tasks. Similar to the replication 
buckets, the master also creates several verification buckets to accumulate the verification 
sub-task requests. When a verification bucket is full, the master will generate a verification 
reduce task to compute all the requests in that bucket.  
Although the request bucketing technique merges multiple sub-tasks into one reduce task, 
it does not undermine the accuracy with the following reasons. First, the two-layer check is 
still performed on each original reduce sub-task. Second, the replication and verification 
sub-tasks are assigned to workers randomly. 
3.5 Theoretical Study 
3.5.1 Quantitative Analysis 
Since in the map phase and the reduce phase, IAMR performs the same two-layer check 
technique (only on different objects), we can use a similar model to analyze both phases. 
Even though the request bucketing technique merges sub-tasks to execute, the assignment 
of sub-task requests to the buckets and the assignment of buckets to the workers are all 
randomized. This is equivalent to the effect of assigning each sub-task request to workers 
randomly. 
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Based on the above reason, we perform a unified analysis on both the map phase and the 
reduce phase in Section 3.5.1.1. The only difference is that in the map phase, our analysis 
focuses on “tasks”, while in the reduce phase, our analysis focuses on “sub-tasks”. To 
simplify our expression, we use the term “task” at some places. However, the reader should 
understand that it refers to the “sub-task” if it is discussing the reduce phase. We discuss 
security analysis specific for the request bucketing technique in Section 3.5.1.2 
 Unified Analysis on the Map Phase and the Reduce Phase 
We first analyze the adversary strategy of malicious workers. Based on that, we perform 
quantitative analysis on accuracy and overhead. 
Adversary Strategy: We denote the malicious worker fraction on the public cloud as m. 
We assume that the adversary controls all malicious workers. In other words, all malicious 
workers are collusive, and there exists only one collusive group. Assuming that the goal of 
the adversary is to inject as many errors as possible and yet not to reveal the malicious 
workers, we analyze the strategy of the adversary under IAMR as follows. Suppose a task 
is assigned to a malicious worker, two cases are possible for the adversary. 
Case 1 If the adversary has not seen a similar task (i.e., the one with the same input) before, 
it has to make a decision on whether to cheat, and remembers the decision, the current 
task and the returned result. Due to the existence of hold-and-test rule, the adversary is 
not allowed to defer the decision to the time that it sees the replica of the current task. If 
the decision is not to cheat, the worker is obviously safe (i.e., not to be caught). If the 
decision is to cheat, the malicious worker can survive the first-layer check only when 
either the current task is not replicated, or the replica of the current task is assigned to 
another malicious worker.  
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Case 2 If the adversary has seen a similar task before, it is assured that the current task is a 
replication task. It can simply ask the worker to take the same action for the current task 
as the one it has seen before. In this case, it is guaranteed that the malicious worker will 
survive the first-layer check. 
Since in Case 2 the adversary just follows its decision made previously in Case 1, the risk 
of revealing a malicious worker is essentially determined by the adversary’s decision in 
Case 1. Because the master controls task assignment and replication in a randomized 
manner, the adversary in Case 1 cannot predict whether cheating at the current task is safe 
or not. On the other hand, since the master constantly applies the two-layer check on tasks 
in a randomized manner, the adversary cannot tell whether cheating at the current task has 
a smaller chance of detection than cheating at other tasks. Therefore, the only thing the 
adversary can do in Case 1 is to make a random guess/predict in terms of whether the cheat 
can be detected or not. We model the adversary’s decision making behavior in Case 1 as a 
random variable, cheat probability, marked as c. Note that adversaries who cheat rarely 
(e.g., only cheat once in hundreds of tasks) can still fit in our model because we can set c as 
a small value close to 0.  
We study the accuracy and the overhead of IAMR by modeling the system and 
performing the probability analysis. We model the system as two participating parties: the 
malicious worker, modeled with the malicious worker fraction (m) and the cheat 
probability (c); the IAMR, modeled with the replication probability (r), the verification 
probability (v) and the batch size (T). The system modeling parameters and the 
measurement metrics are shown in TABLE 1. We perform a series of probabilistic analysis 
and present our analysis result in Theorem 1. 
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Item Name Definition 
m Malicious worker fraction The fraction of malicious workers on the public cloud. 
c Cheat probability The probability that the adversary decides to cheat when 
he is not sure whether it is safe to cheat. 
r Replication probability The probability that an original task/sub-task is 
replicated. 
v Verification probability The probability that consistent task/sub-task results are 
verified. 
T Batch size The number of tasks/sub-tasks a mapper/reducer has 
executed by passing the probabilistic two-layer check to 
make its batch of results to be accepted by the master. 
L Survival length The expected number of batches a malicious worker can 
submit to the master before it is detected. 
J Job error rate The ratio of incorrect results number to the total results 
number in one job. 
O Overhead The expected number of extra executions for each 
task/sub-task performed on the public cloud. 
V Verifier overhead The expected number of extra executions for each 
task/sub-task performed on the private cloud. 
TABLE 1 IAMR System Modeling Parameters and Measurement Metrics 
Theorem 1. Assuming that the assignment of tasks/sub-tasks is uniformly distributed 
across all workers on the public cloud, and the detected malicious workers are not 
added to the black list, the probability for a malicious mapper/reducer to survive after 
executing n original tasks is 
Sn = (1− cr + crm(1− v))
n
                                                   
(1) 
The survival length of a malicious mapper/reducer is 
)1/( TT SSL −=                                                        (2)  
The job error rate is 
J = m(c(1− r)+ crm(1− v))(1− cr + crm(1− v))T−1                                        (3) 
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The overhead for each task/sub-task is 
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O = (m + r − mr − m(1− r)ST−1 + mr(1− v)(1− c + cm)(rc − rcm + rcmv) Sk
k=0
T−2 ) /U               (4) 
The verifier overhead for each task/sub-task is 
V = ((1− m)r(cm + v − vmc)+ mr(c + v − vc − cm + cmv)ST−1 + rcm(1− m + mv)(1+ rv − rvc) Sk
k=0
T−2 ) /U (5) 
Proof: Sn, the probability of a malicious mapper/reducer to survive after executing n 
original tasks/sub-tasks is the probability summation of all permutations on n independent 
events. Each event should fall into one of the below three cases. 
1. The worker does not cheat. The probability in this case is (1-c); 
2. The worker cheats, but the task/sub-task is not replicated. The probability in this 
case is c(1-r); 
3. The worker cheats, and the task is replicated. However, the other worker 
executing the replication task/sub-task can collude with it. When the consistent 
results pass the first-layer check, the task result is not verified. The probability in 
this case is crm(1-v). 
By summing up the probability of different permutations of above three cases on n 
independent events, we have 
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By applying the multinomial theorem, we have 
Sn = (1− cr + crm(1− v))
n  
Setting n=T, we have ST, the probability that a malicious mapper/reducer submit a batch 
of task/sub-task to a master. The probability that a malicious worker can submit exactly k 
batches to the master without detection (i.e., not detected in first k batches, but detected on 
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the (k+1)th batch) is )1()( T
k
T SS −⋅ .
 
The expected number of batches a malicious worker can submit (survival length) is 
therefore.  
T
T
T
k
k
T S
SSSkL
−
=−⋅=∞
=
1
)1()(
0
 
We are now deriving the value of J. Suppose the batch size is T, the scenario that the 
master accepts exactly k out of T incorrect task results consists of (T-k) events that the 
worker does not cheat, and k events that the worker cheats but undetected. That is 
Δk =
T
T − k




k
i



(1− c)
T−k (c(1− r))i (crm(1− v))k−i
i=0
k  
The expected number of tasks returning incorrect results in a batch (i.e. in T tasks) is 
E = (k × Δk )
k=0
T = (k × TT − k




k
i



(1− c)
T−k (c(1− r))i (crm(1− v))k−i
i=0
k )
k=0
T  
The batch error rate of T tasks is therefore  
TEe /=  
Since the assignment of tasks/sub-tasks on the public cloud is uniformly distributed on 
all workers and the malicious worker fraction m stays constant, we have the job error rate 
ܬ = ݉ ∗ ݁ + (1 − ݉) ∗ 0
= ݉ ∗ ݁
= ݉ܶ ෍(݇ ൬
ܶ
ܶ − ݇൰
்
௞ୀ଴
(1 − ܿ)்ି௞൫ܿ(1 − ݎ)൯௜൫ܿݎ݉(1 − ݒ)൯௞ି௜) 
We are now simplifying the equation J. By reorganizing equation J and applying 
multinomial theorem, we have 
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ܬ = ݉ܶ ෍(݇ ൬
ܶ
ܶ − ݇൰
்
௞ୀ଴
(1 − ܿ)்ି௞෍(൬݇݅ ൰
௞
௜ୀ଴
൫ܿ(1 − ݎ)൯௜൫ܿݎ݉(1 − ݒ)൯௞ି௜))
= ݉ܶ ෍(݇ ൬
ܶ
ܶ − ݇൰
்
௞ୀ଴
(1 − ܿ)்ି௞(ܿ(1 − ݎ) + ܿݎ݉(1 − ݒ))௞) 
To simplify the formula representation, we define 
ܣ = 1 − ܿ	 
ܤ = ܿݎ݉(1 − ݒ) 
By replacing k with T-l, we have 
ܬ = ݉ܶ ෍((ܶ − ݈) ൬
ܶ
݈ ൰ ܣ
௟ܤ்ି௟)
்
௟ୀ଴
 
Expanding ൫்௟൯, we have 
ܬ = ݉෍( (ܶ − 1)!݈! (ܶ − ݈ − 1)! ܣ
௟ܤ்ି௟)
்
௟ୀ଴
= ݉෍൬ܶ − 1݈ ൰ܣ
௟ܤ்ି௟
்
௟ୀ଴
= ݉(෍൬ܶ − 1݈ ൰ܣ
௟ܤ்ି௟
்ିଵ
௟ୀ଴
+ ൬ܶ − 1ܶ ൰ܣ
்) 
By binomial definition, we have ൫்ିଵ் ൯ =
(்ିଵ)!
்!∙(ିଵ)! . By factorial definition 
n!=(n+1)!/(n+1), we have 0!=1!/1=1 and (-1)!=0!/0=1/0. By replacing ൫்ିଵ் ൯  with 
factorial form and replacing (-1)! With 1/0, we have 
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ܬ = ݉൭෍൬ܶ − 1݈ ൰ܣ
௟ܤ்ି௟
்ିଵ
௟ୀ଴
+ (ܶ − 1)!ܶ! (−1)! ܣ
்൱
= ݉ቌ෍൬ܶ − 1݈ ൰ܣ
௟ܤ்ି௟
்ିଵ
௟ୀ଴
+ 1
ܶ ቀ10ቁ
ܣ்ቍ
= ݉(ܤ(ܣ + ܤ)்ିଵ + 0)
= ݉(ܿ(1 − ݎ) + ܿݎ݉(1 − ݒ))(1 − ܿݎ + ܿݎ݉(1 − ݒ))்ିଵ 
In order to calculate the overhead and the verifier overhead, we divide the original 
tasks/sub-tasks into 11 different categories based on different conditions the task/sub-task 
may encounter, as shown in TABLE 2.  
We summarize the probability, workload and verifier overhead of each category in 
TABLE 3. Here we define workload as the number of executions each task/sub-task has to 
run on the public cloud, marked as W. It includes the original task/sub-task execution and 
the task/sub-task overhead. Therefore, we have W=1+O, where 1 corresponds to the 
original task/sub-task and O corresponds to the overhead.  
Since the categories summarized in TABLE 3 are mutual exclusive and exhaustive, we 
have ∑ ௜ܲଵଵ௜ୀଵ = 1.  
We calculate the expected workload by combining the probability and workload under 
each category. 
 
 
 
 
W = P1 + P11 + (1+W )P4 + (2 +W )(P5 + P6 )+ 2(P2 + P3 + P7 + P8 + P9 + P10 )
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Condition1 Condition 
2, given 
condition 1 
is satisfied 
Condition 3, given condition 2 is satisfied Category 
Number 
The task/ 
sub-task t is 
assigned to a 
malicious 
worker z, which 
survived in the 
current batch  
-- t is not replicated. 1
t is replicated, but z does not cheat. 2
t is replicated but not verified. z cheats. But 
the replication task/sub-task is executed by 
another malicious worker. 
3
 
The task/ 
sub-task t is 
assigned to a 
malicious 
worker z, which 
does not survive 
in the current 
batch 
t is not the 
last 
task/sub-tas
k in the 
current 
batch(i.e., t 
is the one 
being 
detected) 
t is not replicated.  4
 
t is replicated. z does not cheat. The results 
are not verified. 5
 
t is replicated. z cheats. The error is not 
detected. 6
t is replicated. z does not cheat. The results 
are verified. 7
t is the last 
task/sub-tas
k in the 
current batch 
(i.e., the one 
being 
detected). 
-- 8
The task/ 
sub-task t is 
assigned to a 
benign worker 
z. 
t is 
replicated. 
The corresponding replication task is 
assigned to a malicious worker. The 
malicious worker cheats. 
9 
The corresponding replication task returns 
the same result as the original one. 
10 
t is not 
replicated 
-- 11 
TABLE 2 Categories of Tasks Based on Assignment Conditions 
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Category 
Number 
Probability Workload W Verifier 
overhead V 
1 1 0 
2 2 v 
3 2 0 
4  1+W V 
5 2+W V 
6 2+W V 
7 2 1 
8 2 1 
9  2 1 
10 2 v 
11 1 0 
TABLE 3 The Probability, Workload and Verifier Overhead of Each Category 
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We calculate the expected verifier overhead by combining the probability and verifier 
overhead under each category.  
 
By reorganizing the formula and replacing Pi with the value in TABLE 3, we have, 
O = (m + r − mr − m(1− r)ST−1 + mr(1− v)(1− c + cm)(rc − rcm + rcmv) Sk
k=0
T−2 ) /U  
V = ((1− m)r(cm + v − vmc)+ mr(c + v − vc − cm + cmv)ST−1 + rcm(1− m + mv)(1+ rv − rvc) Sk
k=0
T−2 ) /U  
, where U =1− (1− rc − rv + rcv + rcm − rcmv)rc(1− m + mv)m Sk
k=0
T−2                                   
 Analysis on Request Bucketing Technique 
We introduce four parameters specific for the request bucketing technique, shown in 
TABLE 4.  
Item Name Definition 
K task key number The number of keys (records) generated by an original 
reduce task. 
S sub-task key number The number of keys covered by a sub-task. 
R report number The number of reports an original reduce task sends to 
the master. 
B bucket size The maximum number of sub-task requests contained in 
a bucket. 
TABLE 4 IAMR System Modeling Parameters for Reduce Phase 
The total number of reports a master receives from one original reduce task is . 
In our design, an original reduce task result is accepted by the master when its submitted 
task number achieves the batch size. In other words, we can adjust the parameters to have 
the batch size T to be equal to the report number (i.e., T=R). When K is big enough, we can 
set T to a big value by adjusting S to ensure high accuracy. For example, in the word count 
application in Section 3.7.1.2, the single original reduce task output contains 598,000 keys. 
V = vP2 +VP4 +VP5 + P7 + P8 + P9 + vP10
R = K / S 
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In this case, in order to set T to 600 to ensure high accuracy, we can set S as . 
When request bucketing is applied, the two-layer check is still applied to each sub-task. 
Also, the assignment of sub-tasks is still random. Therefore, request bucketing will not 
undermine the IAMR’s accuracy. In addition, the number of sub-tasks is not reduced with 
the introduction of request bucketing. Only the replication/verification reduce task number 
is affected. Suppose the number of replication/verification reduce sub-tasks generated in a 
job is , without request bucketing, the replication/verification reduce task number is , 
since each sub-task will be executed in an independent task. However, with request 
bucketing, the number of replication/verification reduce tasks will be . 
3.5.2 Simulation Result 
We present several simulation results based on Figure 6 to analyze the relationships 
among accuracy, overhead, and other system parameters.  
We first simulate the job error rate under different system parameters in Figure 6(a). The 
four curves show that when other parameters (c, v, r and m) are fixed, increasing batch size 
T will reduce the job error rate J, and when T is greater than 200, J is close to 0 for any 
parameter combinations in the figure. Moreover, when T and other parameters are fixed, J 
will be increased if malicious worker fraction m is increased or the replication probability r 
is decreased. For example, when T is 50 and r is 0.5, J increases from near 0 to 0.06 when 
m increases from 0.5 to 1.0; when T is 50 and m is 1.0, J increases from 0.06 to 0.15 when 
r drops from 0.5 to 0.3. 
K / R = 997
R R
R / B 
  38
(a) (b) (c) 
(d) (e) (f) 
Figure 6 Simulation of IAMR Analysis 
Figure 6(b) shows the relationship between cheat probability c and job error rate J with 
fixed T and v. According to the simulation, when T is 50, r is 0.5, and m is 0.5, the 
maximum J an adversary can achieve is less than 0.01. When m is 1.0, setting r as 0.5 can 
limit J to less than 0.09. The simulation also shows an interesting tradeoff between c and J: 
if c is too big, the malicious worker would be detected easily and thus its injected errors are 
rejected, resulting in a smaller J; if c is too small, the number of injected errors is reduced, 
which also results in a smaller J. 
Figure 6(c) shows the relationship between c and J when T is 600, v is 0.07, and r is 0.16. 
With this configuration, even if when m is 1.0, the maximum J the adversary can achieve is 
less than 0.06; when m is no larger than 0.5, the maximum J is close to 0.  
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Figure 6(d) shows the relationship between cheat probability c and survival length L 
when T is 50 and v is 0.15. We can see that L is generally very small when c is bigger than 
0.02, which means that a malicious worker cannot survive IAMR checks for a very long 
time. Our experimental results in Figure 12 confirm this observation. However, L increases 
exponentially when c decreases from 0.02 to 0, which suggests that IAMR cannot remove 
very low-profile malicious workers (those that rarely cheat) quickly, but since such 
workers inject very few errors at the same time, IAMR can still guarantee very low job 
error rate in that case.  
Figure 6(e) shows the tradeoff between job error rate J and overhead O, and Figure 6(f) 
shows the tradeoff between job error rate J and verifier overhead V, given different batch 
size T. For each curve in the figures, the top-left most point corresponds to the setting 
where T is 0, and the bottom-right most point corresponds to the case where T is 600. The 
difference of T values between adjacent points on each curve is 50. The figures show that 
when T is small (e.g., 50), a higher value of r results in a lower job error rate and higher 
overhead and verifier overhead. When T is big enough (e.g., greater than 200), different 
values of r do not make much difference in job error rate. However, a smaller value of r 
would bring a smaller overhead and verifier overhead limit. We find that on each curve, the 
points become denser with the increase of T and eventually concentrate to their outmost 
limits. This suggests that when T is big enough (e.g., bigger than 200), increasing T further 
would bring neither additional accuracy benefit, nor additional overhead or verifier 
overhead cost. 
Note that Figure 6 assumes that m is constant, i.e., detected malicious workers are not 
eliminated. Yet in our implementation, detected malicious workers are eliminated, which 
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reduces errors. As a result, task/sub-task reschedule will be reduced, and the overhead and 
verifier overhead should be lower than the simulation result. 
In summary, the simulation result shows that when setting T as a reasonably big number, 
IAMR can achieve a very low job error rate even if the malicious worker dominates the 
public cloud environment. Meanwhile, by increasing the batch size T, the job error rate 
decreases with the increase of overhead and verification overhead. However, both the 
overhead and the verification overhead are bounded when T increases. 
3.6 Optimal Parameter Searching Algorithms 
Simulations in Section 3.5.2 indicate that the job error rate is determined by several 
parameters. How to find an appropriate parameter setting to satisfy the user’s requirement 
in the adversarial environment is a challenging problem. In this section, we model the 
interaction between the IAMR system and the attacker as a two-player zero-sum game, and 
explore the method to search for optimal parameter values that can satisfy the user’s 
accuracy requirement and restriction settings. 
3.6.1 Model the System as a Two-player Zero-sum Game 
By studying the monotonicity of the job error rate formula (3) in Figure 6, we have the 
following theorem. 
Theorem 2. When other parameters are fixed, the job error rate J will  
a) Monotonically decrease if the batch size T increases. 
b) Monotonically decrease if the replication probability r increases. 
c) Monotonically decrease if the verification probability v increases. 
d) Monotonically increase if the malicious worker fraction m increases. 
e) First increase and then decrease when the cheat probability c increases. 
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It is easy to prove the monotonicity of J by analyzing the sign of the partial derivative of 
(3) on T, r, v, m and c. Thus we skip the proof in this dissertation. 
We also study the monotonicity of the job error rate when the attacker always chooses 
the best cheat probability. 
Theorem 3. When other parameters are fixed and the attacker always chooses the best 
cheat probability, the job error rate J will  
a) Monotonically decrease if the batch size T is greater than 1 and increases. 
b) Monotonically decrease if the replication probability r increases. 
c) Monotonically decrease if the verification probability v increases. 
Proof: Since J is a convex function of variable c, the attacker can search for the optimal 
value by solving the equation డ௃డ௖ = 0. By solving this equation, we have 
 ܿ = ଵ௥்(ଵି௠(ଵି௩))                                                               (6) 
When the attacker sets c as ଵ௥்(ଵି௠(ଵି௩)), it can achieve the highest job error rate. By 
substituting c with (6) on (3), we have 
ܬ = ݉ (்ିଵ)೅షభ்೅ (
ଵ
௥(ଵି௠ା௠௩) − 1)                                           (7) 
 According to (7), J is monotonically decreasing, when T>1 is increasing, r is increasing 
or v is increasing.                                                                                       
Theorem 2 suggests that the IAMR system and the attacker determine the job error rate 
together. From the IAMR system’s perspective, the job error rate will decrease if it 
a) Increases the batch size T, or 
b) Increases the replication probability r, or 
  42
c) Increases the verification probability v. 
From the Attacker’s perspective, the job error rate will increase if it 
a) Increases the malicious worker fraction m, or 
b) Sets the cheat probability c closer to the optimal value maximize the job error 
rate. 
This system forms a two-player zero-sum game. We therefore propose the Interactive 
Gradient Descent (IGD) algorithm to find the system parameter setting that makes the 
system achieve Nash Equilibrium, meanwhile guaranteeing the job error rate close enough 
to the user’s accuracy requirement. Based on the IGD algorithm, we propose the Tiered 
Interactive Gradient Descent (TIGD) algorithm, which not only achieves the goal of IGD, 
but also considers user’s restriction settings. 
3.6.2 Interactive Gradient Descent Algorithm 
In this section, we introduce the Interactive Gradient Descent (IGD) Algorithm, an 
algorithm that searches for optimal value of T to ensure the resulting job error rate close 
enough to user’s requirement. In this algorithm, we assume the value of r and v are fixed 
value preset by the user. We present the Tiered Interactive Gradient Descent algorithm in 
Section 3.6.3 to remove this assumption and further improve the algorithm effect. 
According to Theorem 2, from IAMR’s perspective, setting T as large as possible surely 
can minimize the job error rate. However, setting T as a significantly large number requires 
a significantly large number of tasks in order to be accepted in a batch, which is not 
practical in real situations. On the other hand, the effect of decreasing the job error rate is 
weakening when T is increasing. Therefore, if a user can set a reasonable small value as the 
target job error rate and if IAMR can achieve that value, we assume the user is satisfied. 
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We call the user’s target job error rate as the acceptable job error rate, marked as J0. Our 
goal is to find a value T that makes the job error rate close enough to J0 no matter how the 
malicious worker behaves. 
In order to achieve our goal, we analyze the behaviors of both IAMR and the attacker. 
Since IAMR and the attacker form a two-player zero-sum game, the two players have 
conflicting interests. For the attacker, she will maximize the job error rate J (i.e., to make J 
as close to 1.0 as possible). For IAMR, she will make the job error rate close to the 
acceptable job error rate J0 as much as possible. We formalize the two players’ interests by 
defining their utility functions. Finding a parameter setting that minimizes a player’s utility 
function is equivalent to achieving that player’s goal. In other words, for each player, in 
order to achieve her goal, she will search for a parameter setting that minimizes her utility 
function. 
For IAMR, we define her utility function as follows. 
UIAMR = (J − J0 )
2  
By substituting J with (3), we have 
UIAMR (T, r, v, m, c, J0 ) = (m(c(1− r)+ crm(1− v))(1− cr + crm(1− v))
T−1
− J0 )
2                (8) 
The square operation in (8) ensures that as J approaches J0, the utility function becomes 
smaller. In other words, if IAMR can minimize its utility function, she can make J as close 
to J0 as possible, which achieves her goal. Since we assume the value of r and v are fixed, to 
minimize the utility, IAMR needs to search for an appropriate value for T. 
On the other hand, when IAMR chooses a value for T, r and v, the attacker will need to 
search for appropriate values for m and c to maximize the job error rate, and thereby to 
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achieve her goal. For the value of m, the attacker only needs to set it as large as possible, 
since a larger value of m will incur a higher job error rate. Therefore, we assume m to be the 
highest fraction of malicious workers the attacker can inject to the public cloud. In the 
worst case that the malicious worker dominates the public cloud, we assume m as 1.0. For 
the value of c, the attacker needs to find a proper value between 0 and 1 to maximize the job 
error rate (according to property e) in Theorem 2). We define the attacker’s utility function 
as follows: 
UATT = (1− J )
2  
By substituting J with (3), we have 
UATT (T, r, v, m,c) = (1− m(c(1− r)+ crm(1− v))(1− cr + crm(1− v))
T−1)2                (9) 
The square operation in (9) ensures that as J approaches 1.0, the utility function becomes 
smaller. In other words, if the attacker can minimize its utility function, she can make J as 
large as possible, which achieves her goal. In order to minimize the utility function, the 
attacker has to find a suitable value for c. 
Both IAMR and the attacker need to minimize their own utilities. However, the value of 
the utility function for each player is determined by the parameters controlled not only by 
herself but also by her opponent. We therefore propose the Interactive Gradient Descent 
algorithm that can help IAMR search for a parameter setting, which makes both parties 
have no incentive to deviate. In other words, the output of the algorithm achieves Nash 
Equilibrium in the two-player game. The algorithm is shown in Figure 7. The idea of the 
algorithm is to perform fictitious play [70] between the IAMR and the attacker, in which 
two players take turns to adjust the parameter they can control to minimize their own utility 
function value. Theorem 5 shows that after limited iterations, the algorithm will terminate. 
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Theorem 6 shows that the algorithm result ensures that the game achieves Nash 
Equilibrium. In other words, both parties have no incentive to deviate from the algorithm 
suggested parameter values. Theorem 7 shows that the algorithm returned job error rate 
will be close enough to the acceptable job error rate J0. 
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Interactive_Gradient_Descent(m, r, v, J_0, T_init, c_init){ 
    T = T_init; 
    c = c_init; 
    J_IAMR = 0; 
    J_ATT = 1; 
    while(|J_IAMR-J_ATT|<δ){ 
      result = minimizeUiamr(UIAMR, T, r, v, m, c, J_0); 
      J_IAMR = result.getNewJ(); 
      T = result.getNewT(); 
      result = minimizeUatt(UATT, T, r, v, m, c); 
      J_ATT = result.getNewJ(); 
      c = result.getNewC(); 
    } 
    T_opt = T; 
    c_opt = c; 
    J_opt = J_ATT; 
    return T_opt, c_opt, J_opt; 
} 
Figure 7 Interactive Gradient Descent Algorithm 
As shown in Figure 7, the IGD algorithm takes accepted job error rate J_0, m, r, v, the 
initial value of T (T_init) and the initial value of c (c_init) as arguments and returns a 
suggested value of T (T_opt), which guarantees that the job error rate does not exceed 
J_opt, no matter what cheat probability the attacker chooses. In fact, the optimal value of c 
the attacker can choose to maximum the job error rate is the suggested c_opt. Note that in 
this algorithm, m, r and v are fixed values, which do not change during the algorithm 
execution. 
The algorithm performs multiple iterations until converge. In each iteration, it first 
searches for the value T that minimizes the utility function UIAMR on variable T, with the 
current value c fixed (In the function minimizeUiamr in line 6 of Figure 7). This step 
simulates the situation that when the attacker sets a value for c, IAMR searches for the 
optimal value of T that makes J close to J0 as much as possible. After this step, the 
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corresponding value of J is recorded in J_IAMR, and the value of T is updated with the new 
value (line 7 and 8). After that, it invokes the function minimizeUatt (line 9) to search for a 
value of c that minimizes the attacker’s utility function UATT. This step simulates the 
situation that when IAMR sets a value for T, the attacker searches for the optimal value of 
c that makes J as high as possible (i.e., as close to 1 as possible). After this step, the 
corresponding value of J is recorded in J_ATT, and the value of c is updated with the new 
value (line 10 and 11). After each iteration, the algorithm checks if the difference between 
J_IAMR and J_ATT are reduced to a small value (i.e., the variable δ). If true, the iteration 
terminates and the latest value of T, c and J_ATT are returned; otherwise, the algorithm 
proceeds to the next iteration. 
Since UIAMR is differentiable on variable T, we can perform gradient descent on variable 
T in function minimizeUiamr to minimize UIAMR. Since UATT is differentiable on variable c, 
we can perform gradient descent on variable c in function minimizeUatt to minimize UATT. 
Gradient descent algorithm can search for the local minimum value for a given function. 
Since the two utility functions are both convex functions, whose local minimum value is 
also the global minimum value, the return of the gradient descent algorithm will always be 
the optimal parameters that minimize the utility. The two function implementations are 
standard gradient descent procedure.  
The pseudo code of minimizeUiamr is in Figure 8. The algorithm adjusts the value of T in 
the negative direction of the utility function gradient in multiple iterations until the utility 
function value converges. The implementation of minimizeUatt is similar to Figure 8.  
0 
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minimizeUiamr(UIAMR, init_T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c, J_0){ 
    old_utility = UIAMR(init_T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c, J_0); 
    old_T = init_T; 
    do{ 
        old_utility = new_utility; 
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        T = T-γ* ∂UIAMR
∂T
; 
        new_utility = UIAMR(T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c, J_0); 
    }while(|old_utility-new_utility|>ε) 
    return {J(T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c), T}; 
} 
Figure 8 Minimize UIAMR with Gradient Descent on T 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
7 
8 
9 
minimizeUatt(UATT, init_T, init_c, init_r, init_v, init_m){ 
    old_utility = UATT(init_T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c); 
    old_c = init_c; 
    do{ 
        old_utility = new_utility; 
        c = c-γ* ∂Uattacker
∂c
; 
        new_utility = UATT(init_T, init_r, init_v, init_m, c); 
    }while(|old_utility-new_utility|>ε) 
    return {J(init_T, init_r, init_v, init_m, c), c}; 
} 
Figure 9 Minimize UATT with Gradient Descent on c 
The only difference is that the partial derivative is performed on function UATT and on 
variable c. We show its pseudo code in Figure 9. The accuracy and the efficiency of the 
gradient descent depend on two parameters: the step size γ and the convergence threshold ε. 
If the step size γ is too small, the convergence of gradient descent algorithm will be very 
slow. If the step size γ is too large, convergence will initially be very fast, but the algorithm 
will oscillate about the optimum. Ideally, the convergence threshold ε in Figure 8 and 
Figure 9 and δ in Figure 7 should be set as small as possible. However, considering the 
algorithm execution speed, the value should be set as practically small. We will discuss the 
choice of all the parameters in Section 3.7.2. 
The following theorems show that, the IGD algorithm in Figure 7 will converge after a 
limited number of iterations; the return parameter values guarantee Nash Equilibrium and 
the J_opt returned from the algorithm is close enough to J0. 
Theorem 4. For any two consecutive iterations in IGD algorithm, suppose the algorithm 
generates J_IAMRi and J_ATTi in the former iteration, and generates J_IAMRi+1 and 
J_ATTi+1 in the later iteration. We have 
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0 < J_IAMRi+1 < J_ATTi+1 < J_ATTi                                                (8) 
Proof: It is trivially to see that 0 < J_IAMRi+1 < J_ATTi+1. It is easily to prove that in (6), 
when J0 is small enough, UIAMR is monotonically decreasing with the increase of T. 
Consider any two consecutive iterations in Figure 7, namely iteration i and iteration i+1. 
We mark the resulting J_IAMR (line 7), J_ATT (line 10), T (line 8) and c (line 11) in 
iteration i as J_IAMRi, J_ATTi, Ti and ci. In order for the iteration i+1 to receive a minimum 
job error rate after calling minimizeUiamr at line 6 of the IGD Algorithm in Figure 7, T will 
be increased. In other words, Ti+1>Ti. Since J is monotonically decreasing with the 
increase of T (according to Theorem 2), which makes the minimum of UATT monotonically 
increasing with the increase of T, we have 
ܯ݅݊൫ ஺்்ܷ೔൯ < ܯ݅݊൫ ஺்்ܷ೔శభ൯. 
Therefore, J_ATTi+1< J_ATTi.                                                                                 
Theorem 5. The IGD algorithm will terminate after a limited number of iterations. 
Proof: According to Theorem 4, J_ATT is monotonically decreasing in each iteration. We 
prove that after limited number of iterations, |J_IAMR – J_ATT| will be no larger than an 
arbitrarily small positive number δ. By contradiction, we assume |J_IAMR – J_ATT| is 
always larger than a small value δ, since J_ATT is monotonically decreasing, suppose after 
k iterations, J_ATT decreases to J_ATTk < δ, since J_IAMRk < J_ATTk and |J_IAMRk 
-J_ATTk |< δ, we have J_IAMRk < 0, which contradicts with Theorem 4. Therefore, setting 
the threshold in the IGD algorithm in Figure 7 as δ will make the algorithm terminate. 
Since δ is an arbitrarily small positive number, setting threshold as any positive value will 
guarantee the termination of the IGD algorithm.                                
Theorem 6. The IGD algorithm returns a set of parameter setting that form Nash 
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Equilibrium. 
Proof: Firstly, since the utility functions UIAMR and UATT are convex functions. They both 
have no more than one minimum value. Therefore, the local minimum values generated by 
the gradient descent algorithm are global minimum values.  
Suppose the IGD algorithm returns J_opt, c_opt and T_opt. According to the definition 
of the algorithm, T_opt ensures that the IAMR system’s utility function UIAMR achieves the 
global minimum value, when the attacker sets the cheat probability as c_opt. Also, c_opt 
ensures that the attacker’s utility function UATT achieves the global minimum value, when 
IAMR system sets the batch size as T_opt. Therefore, for IAMR system, changing T from 
T_opt to any other value T´ will increase the UIAMR, if the attacker keeps the setting of c as 
c_opt. The IAMR system therefore has no incentive to deviate from T_opt. Similarly, for 
the attacker, changing c from c_opt to any other value c´ will increase UATT, if IAMR 
system keeps the setting of T as T_opt. The attacker therefore has no incentive to deviate 
from c_opt. Since both players have no incentive to deviate from the IGD algorithm 
returned parameter values, Nash Equilibrium is achieved.                               
Theorem 7. The IGD algorithm returned job error rate J_opt satisfies user’s accuracy 
requirement. In other words, J_opt is close enough to J0. 
Proof: Suppose the IGD algorithm in Figure 7 terminates when the value of J_IAMR is 
close enough to J_ATT at iteration i, we have |J_IAMRi-J_ATTi|<δ. According to Theorem 
2, J is monotonically decreasing when T increases. It is also easy to prove that lim்→ஶ ܬ = 0. 
Therefore, for any J0 that is close to 0, there exists a T that makes J=J0. In other words, the 
minimum of UIAMR is 0. A gradient descent algorithm performed in Figure 8 can find a local 
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minimum of UIAMR, which is a global minimum due to the fact that UIAMR is a convex 
function. Therefore the invocation of minimizeUiamr() at line 6 of the IGD algorithm in 
Figure 7 returns an J_IAMRi, which makes |J_IAMRi-J0|<ξ, where ξ is an arbitrary small 
positive number. Since J_opt = J_ATTi, we have |J_opt-J0|<ξ+δ. Since ξ and δ are both 
arbitrary small values, J_opt is close enough to J0                                 
Since the IGD algorithm returned job error rate is close enough to the accepted job error 
rate and the attacker cannot further increase the job error rate, the parameter setting 
returned from the IGD algorithm is the optimal setting. Therefore, by setting T with the 
IGD returned T_opt, IAMR can achieve the lowest job error rate upper bound J_opt. 
3.6.3 Tiered Interactive Gradient Descent Algorithm 
According to IGD algorithm, when m is large, if J0 is set to a very small value, the 
algorithm will return a large value of T. For example, according to TABLE 9, when J0 is set 
to 0.001, m is 1.0, the IGD algorithm will return a value of T as large as 27,796. It is 
because the effect of decreasing job error rate is weakened when T increases. For example, 
according to Figure 6 (a), if r is set to 0.5, m is set to 1.0, when the batch size T increases 
from 0 to 50, the job error rate J drops from 0.47 to 0.07; when the batch size T further 
increases from 50 to 100, the job error rate J only drops from 0.07 to 0.01. On the other 
hand, we also observe that increasing the value of v or r can effectively decrease the job 
error rate, especially when the value of v or r is small. Hence, in order to achieve a small 
job error rate, instead of unlimitedly increasing T, increasing v or r will be a good option. 
On the other hand, the characteristics of IAMR and the cloud-based MapReduce service 
determine that guaranteeing high result integrity in MapReduce computation is not free. A 
user usually has to consider the several system restrictions when using IAMR to compute 
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their jobs. Specifically, the restrictions include the following aspects:  
1. The total number of tasks in a job. Even if increasing the batch size T can help 
decreasing the job error rate, the IAMR system requires the total number of tasks 
no less than the value of T. Hence the batch size T should be no greater than the 
total task number. It should have a limit. We call the maximum value of T that 
IAMR can set as the maximum batch size. We marked the maximum batch size as 
Tmax. 
2. The number of replicated tasks. Since the computing service provider usually 
charges the user by the time of computing, assuming each task takes the similar 
amount of time to be executed, the extra financial cost is therefore proportional to 
the number of replicated tasks. Hence the replication probability r should have a 
proper upper limit to ensure the extra financial cost paid to the public cloud 
within user’s budget. We call the maximum value of r that IAMR can set as the 
maximum replication probability, marked as rmax.  
3. The number of verified tasks. Verifying task requires users to consume their own 
computing resources, which may not be free (e.g., it requires users to invest on 
their own IT infrastructures) or time consuming (e.g., it needs to download data 
from computing service providers). Hence the verification probability v should 
also be bounded. We call the maximum value of v that IAMR can set as the 
maximum verification probability, marked as vmax. 
We propose the Tiered Interactive Gradient Descent (TIGD) algorithm, which ensures 
that the IAMR’s system setting is within the user’s system restriction settings (Tmax, rmax 
and vmax), meanwhile returning a job error rate as close to J0 as possible. 
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This TIGD algorithm is based on the IGD algorithm. It performs three sets of interactive 
gradient descent algorithms to adjust T, r, and v, respectively. The sequence of the three 
interactive gradient descents is determined by the importance of the three system 
restriction aspects. The interactive gradient descent on T and c is firstly performed because 
T can be increased “financially free”, as long as T does not exceed Tmax. The interactive 
gradient descent on r and c is performed before the interactive gradient descent on v and c 
because the task replication is performed on the public cloud, and the task verification is 
performed on the private cloud. Increasing task verification probability means putting 
more computing workload on the private cloud, which increases IT infrastructure 
investment and involve more cross-cloud communication (It is because that DFS is 
deployed on the public cloud). However, increasing replication probability only increases 
the workload on the public cloud, which is economically more practical. 
The TIGD algorithm is shown in Figure 10. The algorithm accepts the following 
parameters: the user’s evaluation on m (m_0), accepted job error rate (J_0); the initial 
replication probability and the maximum replication probability (r_init and r_max); the 
initial verification probability and the maximum verification probability (v_init and v_max); 
the initial batch size and the maximum batch size (T_init and T_max); and the initial value 
of cheat probability (c_init). The algorithm returns a suggested parameter setting, T_opt, 
r_opt, v_opt, which guarantees that the job error rate does not exceed J_opt, regardless of 
the cheat probability the attacker chooses (In fact, the optimal value of c the attacker can 
choose to maximum the job error rate is c_opt). 
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Tiered_Interactive_Gradient_Descent(m_0, J_0, r_init, r_max, v_init, v_max, T_init, 
T_max, c_init){ 
    T = T_init; 
    c = c_init; 
    r = r_init; 
    v = v_init; 
    J_IAMR = 0; 
    J_ATT = 1; 
    while(|J_IAMR-J_ATT|<δ){ 
      gdResult = minimizeUiamrOnT(UIAMR, T, r, v, m, c, J_0, T_max); 
      J_IAMR = gdResult.getNewJ(); 
      T = gdResult.getNewT(); 
      gdResult = minimizeUatt(UATT, T, r, v, m, c); 
      J_ATT = gdResult.getNewJ(); 
      c = gdResult.getNewC(); 
    } 
    if(|J_ATT-J_0|<δ){ 
      J_IAMR = 0; 
      J_ATT = 1; 
      while(|J_IAMR-J_ATT|<δ){ 
        gdResult = minimizeUiamrOnR(UIAMR, T, r, v, m, c, J_0, r_max); 
        J_IAMR = gdResult.getNewJ(); 
        r = gdResult.getNewR(); 
        gdResult = minimizeUatt(UATT, c, T, r, v, m); 
        J_ATT = gdResult.getNewJ(); 
        c = gdResult.getNewC(); 
      } 
    } 
    if(|J_ATT-J_0|<δ){ 
      J_IAMR = 0; 
      J_ATT = 1; 
      while(|J_IAMR-J_ATT|<δ){ 
        gdResult = minimizeUiamrOnV(UIAMR, T, r, v, m, c, J_0, v_max); 
        J_IAMR = gdResult.getNewJ(); 
        v = gdResult.getNewV(); 
        gdResult = minimizeUatt(UATT, c, T, r, v, m); 
        J_ATT = gdResult.getNewJ(); 
        c = gdResult.getNewC(); 
      } 
    } 
    T_opt = T; 
    r_opt = r; 
    v_opt = v; 
    c_opt = c; 
    J_opt = J_ATT; 
    return T_opt, r_opt, v_opt, c_opt, J_opt; 
} 
Figure 10 Tiered Interactive Gradient Descent Algorithm 
The algorithm performs three sets of fictitious plays between the IAMR and the attacker. 
Each set of fictitious play performs a modified IGD algorithm. In those modified IGD 
algorithms, the restricted gradient descent algorithm, instead of the standard gradient 
descent algorithm, is performed on the variables T, r, and v (in line 9, 20, 32 in Figure 10). 
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However, it still performs standard gradient descents on variable c because we assume the 
attacker does not have any restriction concerns. 
The three IGDs in Figure 10 are performed on variables T and c, r and c, and v and c, 
sequentially. The restricted gradient descent on T is shown in Figure 11. In this algorithm, 
if the variable’s value achieves its upper bound before the utility function converges, the 
algorithm will terminate. For instance, when the restricted gradient descent is performed 
on variable T in Figure 11, the gradient descent algorithm terminates either when the utility 
function converges (in line 9), or when T achieves T_max (in line 6), whichever is earlier. 
The restricted gradient descent on r and v are similar to Figure 11, except that the variables 
to perform compute are r and v. We skip the pseudo code in this dissertation. 
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minimizeUiamrOnT(UIAMR, init_T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c, J_0, T_max){ 
    old_utility = UIAMR(init_T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c, J_0); 
    T = init_T; 
    do{ 
        old_utility = new_utility; 
        T = T-γ* ∂UIAMR
∂T
; 
        if(T>=T_max) 
            break; 
        new_utility = UIAMR(T, init_r, init_v, init_m, init_c, J_0); 
    }while(|old_utility-new_utility|> ε) 
    return T; 
} 
Figure 11 Minimize UIAMR with Restricted Gradient Descent on T 
The TIGD algorithm in Figure 10 first performs an interactive gradient descent on T and 
c (line 8-15). This iteration will try to make J as close to J_0 as possible, meanwhile 
guaranteeing T not exceeding T_max. If the generated job error rate is not close enough to 
J_0, the algorithm will perform another interactive gradient descent on r and c (line 19-26). 
In this iteration, T is set as a fixed value generated from the last IGD. This iteration will 
make J further closer to J0, meanwhile guaranteeing r not exceeding r_max. If the resulting 
J is still not close enough to J_0, a final round of interactive gradient descent will be 
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performed on v and c (line 31-38). The resulting J_opt in line 44 is the final job error rate 
that is closest to J_0. Meanwhile, the resulting T_opt, r_opt and v_opt will not exceed the 
user’s system restriction setting (i.e., Tmax, rmax and vmax). 
Notice that the TIGD algorithm does not guarantee that the resulting job error rate J_opt 
is arbitrarily close to J0. If the values of Tmax, rmax and vmax are too low, the resulting J_opt 
may not be close enough to J0. In this situation, increasing Tmax, rmax or vmax will further 
reduce the difference between J_opt and J0. However, we can prove that J_opt is the lowest 
job error rate that IAMR can achieve under current system restriction setting. 
The following theorem proves that, the TIGD algorithm in Figure 10 will terminate after 
a limited number of iterations; the parameters suggested from the algorithm form Nash 
Equilibrium under the system restriction setting; the job error rate suggested from the 
algorithm is the lowest upper bound under the system restriction settings. 
Theorem 8. The TIGD algorithm will terminate after a limited number of iterations. 
Proof: In Theorem 5, we have proved that the IGD algorithm in Figure 7 will converge. 
With the similar technique, we can prove that the IGD on r and c and the IGD on v and c 
will converge, respectively. The difference between the TIGD algorithm and the IGD 
algorithm is that the former uses restricted gradient descents in each set of iterations. Since 
the restricted gradient descent only adds one more termination condition for the current set 
of iteration, it only makes the current iteration terminate before the utility function value 
converges. Hence, it will not hinder the convergence at any round of IGD in the TIGD 
algorithm. Therefore, the TIGD algorithm will terminate.                          
Theorem 9. The TIGD algorithm returned parameters, T_opt, r_opt, v_opt and c_opt, form 
Nash Equilibrium under the system restriction setting. 
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Proof: The TIGD algorithm in Figure 10 can terminate under three conditions: 
a. After the first IGD, the resulting job error rate is close enough to J0 (i.e., the 
predicate |J_ATT-J_0|<δ in line 16 returns false);  
b. After the first IGD, the predicate in line 16 returns true. Also, after the second IGD, 
the resulting job error rate is close enough to J0 (i.e., the predicate |J_ATT-J_0|<δ 
in line 28 returns false);  
c. The predicates in line 16 and line 28 both return true and the third IGD is 
performed. 
From the attacker’s perspective, in each case, the resulting value of c in the last IGD will be 
the optimal value, which makes the attacker’s utility function achieve minimum. Therefore, 
the attacker has no incentive to deviate from this value. From IAMR’s perspective, it will 
end up with two possibilities: 
1. The resulting J_opt is close enough to J0. The possible terminate condition can be 
either a, b, or c. 
2. The resulting J_opt is not close enough to J0. The possible terminate condition can 
only be c. 
For possibility 1, the resulting utility function UIAMR already achieves its minimum value. 
IAMR has not incentive to deviate from the parameters suggested from the TIGD 
algorithms. For possibility 2, the utility function UIAMR does not achieve its minimum value. 
Increasing the value of T, r or v can further reduce the job error rate and thereby reducing 
UIAMR. However, in this case, the algorithm returned T_opt, r_opt, and v_opt already 
achieve their maximum bounds, Tmax, rmax and vmax, respectively. Further increasing those 
values will violate the system restriction setting. Therefore, IAMR still has no incentive to 
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deviate from T_opt, r_opt or v_opt.                                                   
Theorem 10. The resulting value J_opt returned from the TIGD algorithm either is close 
enough to the accepted job error rate J0 or is the closest value to J0 under the system 
restriction setting. 
Proof: The algorithm will terminate with two possibilities: 
1. The returned J_opt is close enough to J0. That is, |J_opt-J_0|<δ. 
2. The returned J_opt is not close enough to J0. That is, |J_opt-J_0|>=δ. 
For case 1, the returned J_opt is close enough to J0. For case 2, the algorithm returned 
T_opt, r_opt and v_opt will achieve the maximum upper bounds Tmax, rmax and vmax. By 
contradiction, if there exists another optimal job error rate J_opt´<J_opt, according to 
Theorem 3, J_opt´’s corresponding parameters T´, r´ and v´ will satisfy at least one of the 
following conditions: T_opt´>T_opt, r_opt´>r_opt, v_opt´>v_opt, which will violate the 
system restriction setting. Therefore, J_opt is closest value to the acceptable job error rate 
under the system restriction setting in case 2.                                                                   
The TIGD algorithm can find parameter setting that either guarantees the resulting job 
error rate close enough to J0, or guarantees the resulting job error rate to be the lowest 
upper bound within the system restriction setting. Therefore, the TIGD algorithm returned 
parameter setting is an optimal setting. By setting system parameters with T_opt, r_opt and 
v_opt, IAMR can obtain the lowest job error rate upper bound. 
 
3.7 Experimental Results 
We performed two sets of experiments to evaluate the IAMR system. The first set is to 
measure the result checking technique described in Section 3.4. Specifically, our goal is to 
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verify the correctness of the theoretical analysis result and measure the performance 
overhead. The second set of experiments is to measure the optimal parameter searching 
algorithms described in Section 3.6. Since the IGD algorithm is a special case of TIGD 
algorithm, our experiments mainly focus on the TIGD algorithm. 
3.7.1 Experiments on the Result Checking Technique 
We implemented a prototype system based on Hadoop MapReduce and deployed it to a 
hybrid cloud consisting of a local private cloud and Amazon EC2. The experiment 
environment consists of two components: a Linux server (2.93 GHz, 8-core Intel Xeon 
CPU and 16 GiB of RAM) is deployed on a private cloud, running both the master and a 
verifier. Twelve Amazon EC2 micro instances are running as slave workers (Amazon 
Linux AMI 32-bit, 613 MB memory, Shared ECU, Low I/O performance).  
We perform experiments on the map phase and the reduce phase separately to measure 
the job error rate, overhead, verifier overhead, and performance overhead. To compare the 
performance overhead, we set the baseline as a standard MapReduce cluster consisting of 
thirteen nodes deployed on Amazon EC2. Each node is a micro instance. Out of the 13 
nodes, one is running as the master, and the other 12 nodes running as workers. 
 Map Phase 
We measure the job error rate, overhead and verifier overhead of IAMR by running a 
word count MapReduce job (introduced in Figure 1) in an environment with malicious 
MapReduce workers. We simulate such malicious workers by implementing the 
adversary’s strategy described in Section 3.5.1. The word count job consists of 800 map 
tasks and one reduce task. We set T and v as fixed values and vary other parameters with 
different value combinations. 
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The experimental results in TABLE 5 indicate that in all parameter combinations, IAMR 
can keep a very low job error rate.  
System Setting T=50, v=0.15, m=0.5 
c 0.1 0.5 1.0 
r 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 
Jmap (%) 1.31 0.58 0.14 1.08 0.28 0.05 2.25 0.76 0.0 
Omap (%) 46.3 66.3 126.7 47.5 70.1 122.6 51.4 74.6 118.8 
Vmap (%) 4.9 8.3 18.1 6.3 11.5 21.5 9.5 15.4 24.5 
 
System Setting T=50, v=0.15, m=0.167 
c 0.1 0.5 1.0 
r 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 
Jmap (%) 0.48 0.04 0.0 0.19 0.45 0.02 0.11 0.0 0.0 
Omap (%) 33.6 53.7 100.6 32.8 51.5 103.6 34.9 53.5 103.6 
Vmap (%) 4.7 7.8 15.8 4.6 7.3 15.1 10.4 8.5 16.9 
 
TABLE 5 The Job Error Rate, Overhead and Verifier Overhead of Wordcount Application with Map Phase 
Integrity Check 
Overall, the maximum job error rate is 2.25% and the minimum is 0. The changing trend 
of the experimental results is consistent with the simulation result in Section 3.5.2. For 
example, when m and c are fixed (m is 0.167 and c is 0.1), the job error rate J drops from 
0.48% to 0 when r increases from 0.3 to 1.0. When m and r are fixed (m is 0.5 and r is 1.0), 
the job error rate J drops from 0.14% to 0 when c increases from 0.1 to 1.0. On the other 
hand, a higher value of r incurs a higher overhead and a higher verifier overhead. For 
example, when r is 1.0, the average overhead is 112%, and when r is 0.3, the average 
overhead is 41%. We note that the experiment overhead and verifier overhead is lower than 
the simulation result in Figure 6(e) and (f), respectively. This fact confirms our prediction 
in Section 3.5.2: since Figure 6 assumes m as a constant value, its estimation on the 
overhead and the verifier overhead should be higher than the experiment result. 
We observe that in each of the 18 parameter combinations, IAMR is able to eliminate all 
malicious workers during the execution of the word count job. In Figure 12, we use three 
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representative combinations to show how soon each malicious worker is detected and thus 
removed. We can see that under the first two combinations, IAMR can remove all 
malicious workers very quickly (within less than 15% of the total job execution time). 
Under the third combination, the malicious workers are very stealthy (cheat with a 
probability of 10%) and the replication frequency is low (30%), but IAMR can still remove 
all six malicious workers before 50% of the job has finished. Such observations suggest 
that IAMR is effective in detecting malicious workers even if the adversary implements its 
best strategy.  
 
Figure 12 Malicious Worker Elimination Progress 
We also measure the execution time delay introduced by IAMR in the map phase by 
running the same 800-map task word count job. Since here our focus is the delay in the map 
phase, we disable the reduce phase integrity check. In addition, we do not introduce 
malicious workers. The reason is that we believe the customer is willing to pay extra cost to 
detect malicious workers. However, they are reluctant to spend extra money for IAMR 
when there are no malicious workers. The experimental results are shown in TABLE 6. 
The data indicates that the extra running time compared to the baseline increases with the 
increase of r. When r increases from 0.3 to 1.0, the extra running time increases from 19.75% 
to 83.26%. 
Configuration Baseline v=0.15, T=50 
r=0.3 r=0.5 r=1.0 
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Running time(s) 1728 2069 2323 3167 
Extra running time (%) --- 19.75 34.41 83.26 
TABLE 6 The Performance of Map Phase IAMR 
 Reduce Phase 
To measure the reduce phase, we set the replication probability r as 0.16, the verification 
probability v as 0.07, and the batch size T as 600. We set both the replication and 
verification bucket size B as 10 when applying the request bucketing technique. 
Our accuracy test shows that such a configuration guarantees 0 job error rate when m is 
0.5 and c changes among 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0, which is consistent to our simulation in Figure 6 
(c). In this section, we focus on presenting the performance experiment results. We used 
two applications to measure the reduce phase performance overhead: the word count and 
the mahout twenty newsgroups classification5. For a similar reason as the map phase, we 
disabled the map phase integrity check and do not introduce malicious nodes. 
To measure the performance benefits from the request bucketing technique, we perform 
two sets of experiments: the one without using the request bucketing technique and the one 
using such a technique. The experimental results are shown in TABLE 7.  
The word count job was the same job described in Section 3.7.1.1, which consisted of 
800 map tasks and one reduce task. We compared the running time of IAMR with the 
baseline. On average, IAMR without request bucketing took 1,398 seconds to finish the job. 
It produced 88 replication reduce tasks and six verification reduce tasks. Compared with 
the standard MapReduce, which took 979 seconds to finish the same job (we enabled the 
combine phase to accelerate the execution), the execution delay was 43%. When we 
applied the request bucketing to the reduce phase, the number of replication and 
 
5 Twenty Newsgroups Classification Example http://mahout.apache.org/users/classification/twenty-newsgroups.html 
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verification tasks dropped to nine and one, respectively; the execution time was reduced to 
1,263 seconds and the execution delay was reduced to 29%. We attribute the reduced 
execution delay to the fact that the number of replication/verification tasks is reduced. 
App. Job 
No. 
Baseline IAMR without request bucketing IAMR with request bucketing 
Exec. 
time 
 (s) 
Exec. 
time 
(s) 
Delay 
(%) 
Repl. 
Task 
Num. 
Veri. 
Task 
Num. 
Exec. 
 time 
(s) 
Delay 
(%) 
Repl.  
Task 
Num. 
Veri. 
Task 
Num. 
Word 
Count 
1 979 1398 43% 88 6 1263 29% 9 1 
20 
News-
group 
Classif
ication 
1 517 983 90% 95 7 636 23% 10 1 
2 331 482 45% 108 8 465 40% 11 1 
3 210 221 5% 80 6 260 23% 8 1 
4 85 63 -25% 0 1 57 -32% 0 1 
5 161 143 -11% 0 1 138 -14% 0 1 
Ave. Delay 
(%)* 
---- 46% 29% 
* Average delay does not count the direct verification job (i.e., job 4 and 5 in the 20 news letters application).  
TABLE 7 The Performance of Reduce Phase IAMR 
We also ran the Mahout twenty newsgroups classification example on IAMR. This 
application consisted of five jobs. Each of the first three jobs produced more than 100,000 
keys. Hence, IAMR set the batch size T to 600. The last two jobs produced less than 600 
keys, so IAMR directly generated a verification reduce task for each job. The total 
execution time under IAMR without request bucketing was 1,892 seconds. Compared to 
1,304 seconds on the baseline, the execution delay was 45%. When applying request 
bucketing, the execution time was reduced to 1,556 seconds. The execution delay was 
reduced to 19%. It is interesting to notice that the IAMR execution times of the last two 
jobs were shorter than the baseline. This was because the master in IAMR was executed on 
the private cloud, which had more computation power than a micro instance on the public 
cloud. When evaluating the average slow down incurred by IAMR, we excluded these two 
special jobs. 
Overall, the results show that the request bucketing technique played an important role in 
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boosting the performance. Based on the execution time of the word count and the first three 
jobs of 20 newsletters applications, the average execution delay of IAMR without request 
bucketing was 46%. When request bucketing was applied, the average execution delay was 
reduced to 29%. 
3.7.2 Experiments on the Parameter Searching Algorithm 
We mainly performed experiments on the TIGD algorithm. We treated IGD algorithm as 
a special case of TIGD algorithm, where Tmax is unbounded, vmax = vinit and rmax = rinit. 
In this set of experiments, we evaluated the most severe situation by assuming m as 1.0. 
We changed the system restriction setting, including the max batch size (Tmax), the max 
replication probability (rmax) and the max verification probability (vmax), and observed the 
TIGD suggested parameters and their corresponding optimal job error rates. In the 
experiments, we set other parameters as fixed values listed in TABLE 8. 
The experimental results are shown in TABLE 9. It shows that in each system setting, the 
TIGD algorithm can find the optimal job error rate under user’s system restriction setting.  
For instance, when Tmax was 10,000, rmax and vmax were 0.3, the TIGD algorithm can find 
the optimal job error rate as 0.107%, with T as 10,000, r as 0.3 and v as 0.111. When Tmax 
was 1,000, rmax and vmax were 1.0, the algorithm can find the optimal job error rate as 
0.122%, with T as 1,000, r as 1.0 and v as 0.231. When Tmax was 1,000, rmax and vmax were 
both 0.3, the optimal value of J that the algorithm can find is 0.372%. Although such a job 
error rate was high, it was the best value that IAMR can achieve under the user’s system 
restriction setting. In order to further reduce the job error rate, the user had to either 
increase Tmax , rmax or vmax . The fourth row in the table indicates that when Tmax was small 
(such as 100), the TIGD algorithm can still achieve a small value of J (0.124%), if rmax and 
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vmax were set to a large value. 
Item Explanation Value 
J0 The acceptable job error rate 1E-3 
γT The step size in gradient descent on variable T. (the γ value in the implementation 
of minimizeUiamrOnT in Figure 10) 
100 
γ The step size in gradient descent/restricted gradient descent on variable r, v and c. 
(The γ value in the implementation of minimizeUiamrOnR, minimizeUiamrOnV 
and minimizeUatt in Figure 10) 
5E-4 
ε The converge threshold in each gradient descent/restricted gradient descent (the ε 
value in the implementation of each minimization function in Figure 10). 
1E-15 
δ The converge threshold in the TIGD algorithm (the variable δ in Figure 10). 1E-5 
Tinit The initial value of T 10 
rinit The initial value of r 0.1 
vinit The initial value of v 0.1 
cinit The initial value of c 0.1 
TABLE 8 Parameter Settings in TIGD Experiments 
m Tmax rmax vmax Topt ropt vopt Jopt(%) 
1.0 10000 0.3 0.3 10000 0.3 0.111 0.107 
1.0 1000 1.0 1.0 1000 1.0 0.231 0.122 
1.0 1000 0.3 0.3 1000 0.3 0.3 0.372 
1.0 100 1.0 1.0 100 1.0 0.752 0.124 
1.0 +∞* 0.1 0.1 27796 0.1 0.1 0.114 
*This setting is equivalent to executing IGD algorithm 
TABLE 9 Results in TIGD Experiments 
The configuration of the last row of the table was equivalent to execution an IGD 
algorithm. It set the value of rmax and vmax the same as their initial values (rinit=0.1 and 
vinit=0.1, respectively). Tmax was set to infinity, which means that T can be increased 
unboundedly. This experiment was used to compare with the TIGD algorithm. The first 
row of this table had the same initial system configure and generated the same job error rate. 
We notice that, in order to achieve small optimal job error rate (0.114%), T has to be set to 
27,796 in the IGD algorithm. Compared to the first row of TABLE 9, which achieved the 
equivalent job error rate, the resulting T that was generated by IGD algorithm is 178% 
higher than the one generated by TIGD algorithm. The result shows that in order to achieve 
a small job error rate, loosing r and v slightly (to 0.3) can significantly reduce the value of 
the batch size T.  
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To give readers an intuitive understanding of the working procedure of TIGD and IGD 
algorithm, we recorded the job error rate change during the algorithm executions. Figure 
13 a) shows the execution details of the TIGD algorithm when setting system parameters as 
the first row of TABLE 9. The three disjoint curves reflect three iterations of the interactive 
gradient descent. In the first iteration, IAMR and the attacker took turn to adjust the value 
of T and c to minimize their utility function values. We observe that after three rounds of 
interactions, IAMR achieved the maximum batch size Tmax (10,000). And the attacker 
found the optimal value of c that maximizes its utility function when IAMR set T to 10,000. 
(Note that even though in the figure the second and third round appears to be the same 
value of T and c, their values are actually different with a higher precision.) The second 
curve shows the second iteration of interactive gradient descent, where IAMR and the 
attacker adjusted r and c respectively to minimize their utility function values. Note that 
adjusting r has a significant effect in helping reducing the job error rate. After the first 
round of interactive gradient descent, the job error rate was 0.364%. After the second round 
of interactive gradient descent, the job error rate dropped to 0.119%. In the last iteration of 
interactive gradient descent, IAMR and the attacker adjusted the value of v and c 
respectively to minimize their utility function values. After this iteration, the job error rate 
finally dropped to 0.107%. The final suggested values for T, r, and v were 10,000, 0.3 and 
0.111, respectively. 
Figure 13 b) shows the execution details of the IGD algorithm when setting parameters 
as the last row of TABLE 9. We observe that after four rounds of interactive gradient 
descents, the algorithm can also achieve the job error rate (0.114%). However, it required a 
higher value of batch size (i.e. T=27,796). 
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a) b) 
Figure 13 TIGD and IGD algorithm execution details 
 The above experiments show that the TIGD algorithm is an effective method in finding 
the optimal job error rate under different system restriction settings when the malicious 
node dominates the environment. 
3.8 Related Work 
We present the related work about the IAMR in this section. Result Integrity Assurance 
is an old problem that has been studied for years. Researchers have proposed a wide range 
of solutions from different perspectives. The Secure co-processor [43] provides a 
hardware-based solution towards the trusted outsourced computing. The secure hardware 
chip Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) installed on a computer can verify the integrity of 
the worker’s software stack ranging from the bios configuration at the booting procedure to 
the application that executes the outsourced task. By verifying the computing system 
completely complies the software stack specification, such a technology can guarantee the 
correctness of task result [44]. However, this solution requires the configuration of the 
worker’s machine to be exactly identical to the TPM’s expectation. Such a strict 
requirement is only suitable for the dedicated worker, which is used for certain 
computation task. 
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The zero-knowledge proof [46][47][48] tries to address the problem via mathematical 
theoretical study. It requires the interaction between the master (the verifier) the worker 
(the prover). If the worker can submit a proof to the master and the master verifies that 
proof, the master believes the assigned task is faithfully executed and thus accepts the 
result. Gennaro et al. [49] proposed a zero-knowledge protocol that requires no interaction. 
Because such a class of solutions is only efficient on certain special computing applications, 
they are not suitable for the generalized computing platform such as MapReduce. 
A class of practical solutions towards such a problem falls in the direction of task 
replication and verification. IAMR is following this direction. Golle et al. [7] proposed to 
guarantee correctness of the distributed computation result by duplicating computations. 
Zhao et al. [9] proposed a sampling based idea of inserting indistinguishable Quizzes to the 
task package, which is going to be executed by the untrusted worker, and verifying the 
returned result for those Quizzes. Their simulation results show that by combining 
reputation system, Quiz approach gains higher accuracy and lower overhead than 
replication-based approach. However, suggested by their simulation, the reputation 
accumulation is a long-term process so that in order to accumulate reliable reputation, it 
takes as many as 105 tasks, which is not a reasonable number for MapReduce job. 
Moreover, the attacker could pretend to be benign at the reputation accumulation phase and 
commit cheat when its reputation achieves a reliable value. Du et al. [6] proposed to sample 
tasks, and check the sampling task result using Merkle-tree based commitment technique. 
The Merkel-tree based commitment technique can effectively defeat the malicious worker 
who returns correct results only on sampled tasks. The analysis in the paper showed that to 
achieve certain accuracy, the number of samples increases with the decrease of attacker’s 
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cheat probability. For example, in order to restrict the attacker’s successful cheating 
probability to 0.0001, if the malicious worker cheats with probability 0.1, it takes more 
than 88 samples to be inserted to each worker; if the malicious worker cheats with 
probability 0.01, it takes 930 samples to be inserted! Our method, which introduces task 
replication with hold-and-test rule, can reduce the sampled task numbers (i.e., the 
verification task number) with the same accuracy expectation. In addition, we propose a 
different accuracy measurement, i.e., the job error rate, to better cater for the MapReduce 
(Big Data) computation characteristic. Wei et al. [8] explored the similar problem as our 
thesis, i.e., to construct an integrity assurance framework for MapReduce. They proposed 
SecureMR to enforce the commitment protocol and the verification protocol. SecureMR 
employs non-deterministic task duplication to defeat collusive workers. The design 
difference from our research is that the number of duplication task for each original task is 
non-deterministic. Such an approach guarantees 90% of detection rate in defeating 
periodical collusive attacker with 40% of duplication rate when the malicious worker 
fraction is below 0.15 and malicious cheat probability is 0.5. (According to (2) in [8]) 
However, (2) in [8] also shows that when malicious worker fraction is 0.5, malicious cheat 
probability is 0.1, 40% of duplication rate can achieve only 25% of detection rate. The 
maximum detection rate SecureMR can achieve under this environment setting is 80%, 
with a duplication rate more than 500%. In other words, SecureMR works well in an 
environment where the malicious node does not dominate the environment. However, it 
cannot guarantee high integrity in an uncontrolled environment like cloud cluster. 
Some researchers combine the replication/verification technique with game theoretic 
approaches to incentivize workers behave honestly [67][68][69]. They usually design a 
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financial reward/punish mechanism, so that rational workers will behave honestly to 
maximize their profit. Those solutions assume that workers are lazy but rational entities. 
The workers’ goals are to maximize the profit meanwhile using the least computing 
resources. Such a class of solution cannot be applied to the “adversary malicious” worker 
whose goal is to compromise the result integrity without considering the profit. 
Fictitious play was introduced in 1951 [70][71] as a mechanism to compute Nash 
Equilibrium. Overviews on related lines of research are [72][73][74]. Fictitious play has 
been used in security of computer networks [76][77], intrusion detection systems [75], and 
cognitive radios [78]. Such approaches usually model the attacker and the defender as 
fictitious play games, prove the game convergence and provide guidelines for the player to 
maximize her gain. In our dissertation, we model the behaviors of IAMR and the attacker 
as a fictitious play. We prove that the fictitious play will converge and the resulting 
parameters can satisfy user’s accuracy requirements and system restrictions. 
3.9 Summary 
In this chapter we proposed a hybrid cloud-based high result integrity assurance 
MapReduce framework, called Integrity Assurance MapReduce (IAMR). The IAMR 
system performs the result checking technique to guarantee high result integrity even if the 
public cloud contains malicious workers. We also proposed two game theory-based 
optimization algorithms, called Interactive Gradient Descent algorithm and Tiered 
Interactive Gradient Descent algorithm, respectively. The two algorithms can search for 
the optimal parameter setting that can guarantee the lowest job error rate upper bound, with 
considering user’s system restriction setting, if available. We implemented a prototype 
system and deployed it onto a real hybrid cloud environment. Our theoretical analysis and 
  70
experimental results show that IAMR can guarantee high result integrity and incurs a 
modest performance overhead; the TIGD algorithm is effective in finding optimal 
parameter settings under different system restriction settings. Our works are published in 
multiple peer-reviewed journals and conferences [56][57][58][59][60][61]. 
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4 CONFIDENTIALITY ASSURANCE MAPREDUCE 
In this chapter, we will present the Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce (CAMR) 
system. We will start with the motivation of this system. Then we will introduce the system 
architecture and the system overview, define the system assumption and the attacker model, 
present the design details and the implementation details, and describe the experimental 
results. Finally, we will discuss the related work and conclude this chapter. 
4.1 System Motivation 
Today, many public cloud vendors support MapReduce computation services. For 
example, Amazon Web Service offers the Elastic MapReduce (EMR) service to compute 
MapReduce jobs on their virtualized Hadoop cluster. Figure 14 shows how a cloud 
customer uses EMR to compute a MapReduce job. To compute a MapReduce job, a user 
has to upload the MapReduce job and the input data to the Amazon Simple Storage Service 
(S3) storage system and issue a command to set up a virtualized cluster (EMR Cluster), 
which consists of multiple Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) virtual machines. The 
virtualized cluster will load the MapReduce job from S3 storage and execute the job. 
Because the entire program is stored and executed on the public cloud, the open 
architecture of the public cloud gives attackers the opportunity to breach the security 
defense and compromise the confidentiality of the outsourced MapReduce job. For 
example, the attacker can perform the following attacks. (The detailed attacker model is 
described in Section 4.3). 
1. Eavesdrop on the communication between the cloud user and the public cloud, 
shown as attack (1) in Figure 14; or 
2. Access customers’ storage on the public cloud to obtain the executable file of the 
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public program, shown as attack (2) in Figure 14; or 
3. Eavesdrop on the data transfer between the storage node and the virtual machine, 
shown as attack (3) in Figure 14; or 
4. Compromise the virtual machine to observe the execution of the public program, 
shown as attack (4) in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14 The Amazon Elastic MapReduce Use Case and the Attacker Model 
Under this situation, an end-to-end protection on the outsourced MapReduce 
computation on the public cloud is needed. 
Researchers have performed many studies on protecting the confidentiality of the data 
involved in outsourced computation [10][11][12][13][14]. Yet, a satisfying solution to 
protect the confidentiality of outsourced computation itself is still not available. However, 
the demand for such a solution is growing rapidly, as more and more innovative 
algorithmic computations are being deployed to the public cloud. These algorithmic 
computations involve important applications, such as business analytics [30], geospatial 
mapping/searching [31], bioinformatics analysis [29], and image processing [28]. When 
Cloud User
EC2 Instances
Malicious Attacker
(1) (2) (3)
(4)
S3 Storage
EMR Cluster
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companies or individuals outsource their programs to the public cloud [33][34][35][36], 
they wish the algorithms in their programs not to be revealed to others, especially to their 
competitors. 
Control flow, which decides the sequence of instructions (e.g., statements) to be 
executed, directly reflects the algorithm of a program. The condition of the branch 
statement, which determines the runtime control flow, is a critical component of the control 
flow that needs to be protected foremost. As an illustration, imagine a company A offers an 
image processing service like [28] that implements several image manipulation algorithms, 
such as edge detection algorithm. A malicious company B wants to offer similar service 
with the same level of service quality. Company B thus hires a hacker to find out the edge 
detection algorithm that A is using. If company A outsources her service to the public cloud 
and the hacker is able to compromise the public cloud, the hacker can perform reverse 
engineering attacks on A’s program to find out details of A’s algorithm. It is interesting to 
note that a wide class of edge detection algorithms exist [62] and many of them have 
internal parameters that are important to the effectiveness of the algorithms. For example, 
the Canny edge detector [63] is a multi-stage algorithm that can detect a wide range of 
edges in images. Figure 15 shows two stages of that algorithm: generating Gaussian filter 
matrix (the function generateGaussianKernel) and determining edges via double threshold 
and hysteresis (the function performHysteresis).  
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// Two stages of the Canny edge detection algorithm implementation [32]:  
// generating the Gaussian filter matrix (the function generateGaussianKernel) and  
// determining edges via double threshold and hysteresis (the function performHysteresis). 
 
// Constant variables 
private float GAUSSIAN_CUT_OFF = 0.005f; 
private int GAUSSIAN_KERNEL_WIDTH = 16; 
private int LOW_THREASHOLD = 250; 
private int HIGH_THRESHOLD = 750; 
//other variables 
        …… 
public void generate_gaussian_kernel(){ 
    …… 
    for (kwidth = 0; kwidth < GAUSSIAN_KERNEL_WIDTH ; kwidth++) { 
        float g1 = gaussian(kwidth, kernelRadius); 
        if (g1 <= GAUSSIAN_CUT_OFF && kwidth >= 2) break; 
        float g2 = gaussian(kwidth - 0.5f, kernelRadius); 
        float g3 = gaussian(kwidth + 0.5f, kernelRadius); 
        kernel[kwidth] = (g1+g2+g3)/3f/(2f*(float)Math.PI*kernelRadius*kernelRadius); 
        diffKernel[kwidth] = g3 - g2; 
  } 
} 
 
private void performHysteresis(){ 
    Arrays.fill(data, 0); 
    int offset = 0; 
    for (int y = 0; y < height; y++) { 
        for (int x = 0; x < width; x++) { 
            if (data[offset] == 0  
                && magnitude[offset] >= HIGH_THRESHOLD) { 
                follow(x, y, offset); 
            } 
            offset++; 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
private void follow(int x1, int y1, int i1) { 
    …… 
    data[i1] = magnitude[i1]; 
    for (int x = x0; x <= x2; x++) { 
        for (int y = y0; y <= y2; y++) { 
            int i2 = x + y * width; 
            if ((y != y1 || x != x1)&& data[i2] == 0  
                && magnitude[i2] >= LOW_THRESHOLD) { 
                follow(x, y, i2); 
                return; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
Figure 15 Implementation of Canny Edge Detector Program 
In the Canny edge detector algorithm, the accuracy and the speed (i.e., the computation 
time) of detecting image edges are influenced by four parameters involved in the above 
two stages: the size and the cut-off value of the Gaussian filter matrix (represented as 
GAUSSIAN_KERNEL_WIDTH and GAUSSIAN_CUT_OFF in generateGaussianKernel, 
respectively) and the two threshold values (represented as HIGH_THRESHOLD in 
performanceHysteresis and LOW_THRESHOLD in follow, respectively). All these four 
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parameters are critical to the effectiveness and the speed of the edge detection service, so 
they should be kept confidential if company A uses the Canny edge detector algorithm. 
However, those parameters appear as plain text in branch statements of the program, so the 
hacker who has obtained the program can easily find their values by using reverse 
engineering attacks. In this scenario, hiding the branch statement conditions that involve 
those parameters will make it difficult for the attacker to extract values of the algorithmic 
parameters. In addition, hiding other branch statement conditions will further raise the bar 
for the attacker to understand the algorithm’s details. 
Note that in real life, company A may very likely invent its proprietary edge detection 
algorithm, and this is exactly the reason why company A wants to protect the 
confidentiality of its algorithm from company B. Unfortunately, we do not have access to 
any proprietary edge detection algorithm, so we have to use an existing edge detection 
algorithm like the Canny edge detector as an illustration. However, we believe that certain 
properties (e.g., the cut-off value of the Gaussian filter matrix) may well exist in company 
A’s algorithm. In other words, the implementation of company A’s algorithm may also 
contain such confidential information in its branch statement conditions, which makes a 
solution like ours useful. 
Researchers have proposed quite a few solutions to protect the branch statement 
conditions. However, most of them [55][16][51][52][54][64] choose to submit the entire 
program to the adversarial environment in the obfuscated form. This cannot defeat a 
determined attacker as the entire program is exposed in the adversarial environment. The 
attacker can perform static and/or dynamic analysis at will. Other solutions [53][15] 
propose to break the control flow into two or multiple processes. The runtime control flow 
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is determined by the collaboration of those multiple processes. This offers better protection 
of the control flow, but there are well-documented performance shortcomings in those 
existing attempts. For example, [15] proposes a binary-code-level obfuscation based on a 
two-process model, where a program process executes the program, and a monitor process 
determines the control flow. The experimental results show that, when the shuffle rate is 5% 
(i.e., 5% of the control flow is hidden in the monitor process), the execution time of the 
obfuscated program is 1.08 to 3.37 times greater than that of the original program; when 
the shuffle rate is 20%, the execution time of the obfuscated program is 2.77 to 8.87 times 
greater than that of the original program. Such an overhead measurement is based on the 
fact that the two processes are executed on the same host, which enables an attacker to 
perform static and dynamic analysis on the two processes together to reverse engineer the 
control flow. We can imagine that, if we were to execute the two processes on separate 
hosts, the network communication involved would further aggravate the performance 
overhead. 
4.2 Architecture and System Overview 
In this chapter, we propose Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce (CAMR) framework 
to protect the control flow confidentiality of outsourced MapReduce jobs. CAMR use our 
proposed control flow obfuscation method called runtime control flow obfuscation 
(RCFO). RCFO resembles the two-process model in [15]: it breaks the outsourced program 
into two programs: the public program and the private program. The public program 
performs the computation, and the private program maintains the control flow. At runtime, 
the public program performs the computation and queries the private program to determine 
the execution path. Different from existing solutions such as [15], we transform the control 
  77
flow condition into a different format and extract the predicate secret, a constant number, 
from the branch statement condition and hide it in the private program. Based on our 
unique transformation, we propose the continuous cache on the public program to greatly 
reduce the number of control flow queries. Our experimental results show that our solution 
incurs 14.9% to 33.2% of performance overhead on average with different obfuscation 
degree settings. 
Specifically, RCFO first analyzes the conditions of each branch statement in the original 
program and performs a mathematical transformation on it. (In this paper, the term branch 
statement refers only to if statements, as our method works directly at the lower level 
language representation, such as Java byte code, where while and for statements are 
represented by more primitive instructions such as if and goto.) This transforms each 
original predicate into a normalized inequality. The left hand side (LHS) of the inequality is 
a variable expression, called the predicate expression and the right hand side (RHS) is a 
random numeric value, called the predicate secret. Next, RCFO keeps the predicate 
expression in the public program while storing the inequality operator and the predicate 
secret to the private program. After mathematical transformation, the original program is 
transformed into a public program by replacing each predicate with an invocation of a 
control flow query function (CFQ function). A CFQ function invocation takes the predicate 
expression as one of its parameters. The implementation of the CFQ function is in the 
private program. At runtime, the CFQ function returns a Boolean value based on the 
predicate expression, the inequality operator, and the predicate secret, to guide the program 
control flow. 
//Constant variable declarations are removed.  
//Instead, their values are hidden in the private program after RCFO transformation. 
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public void generate_gaussian_kernel(){ 
    …… 
    for(kwidth=0;CFQ(59-kwidth);kwidth++){//PredicateSecret:59+GAUSSIAN_KERNEL_WIDTH=75 
    float g1 = gaussian(kwidth, kernelRadius); 
    if (CFQ(0.01-g1) && kwidth>=2) break; //predicate secret: 0.01+GAUSSIAN_CUT_OFF=0.015 
        float g2 = gaussian(kwidth - 0.5f, kernelRadius); 
        float g3 = gaussian(kwidth + 0.5f, kernelRadius); 
        kernel[kwidth] = (g1+g2+g3)/3f/(2f*(float)Math.PI * kernelRadius * kernelRadius); 
        diffKernel[kwidth] = g3 - g2; 
  } 
} 
 
private void performHysteresis(){ 
    Arrays.fill(data, 0); 
    int offset = 0; 
    for (int y = 0; y < height; y++) { 
        for (int x = 0; x < width; x++) { 
            if (data[offset] == 0  
                && CFQ(magnitude[offset]-54)) {//predicate secret: HIGH_THRESHOLD-54=696 
                follow(x, y, offset); 
            } 
            offset++; 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
private void follow(int x1, int y1, int i1) { 
    …… 
    data[i1] = magnitude[i1]; 
    for (int x = x0; x <= x2; x++) { 
        for (int y = y0; y <= y2; y++) { 
            int i2 = x + y * width; 
            if ((y != y1 || x != x1)&& data[i2] == 0  
                && CFQ(magnitude[i2]+31)) {//predicate secret: LOW_THRESHOLD+31=281 
                follow(x, y, i2); 
                return; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
Figure 16 Condition Transformation of the Canny Edge Detector Implementation in Figure 15 
Figure 16 shows the application of RCFO on the Canny edge detector example in Figure 
15. As Figure 16 shows, the definition of the four critical parameter values 
(GAUSSIAN_KERNEL_WIDTH, GAUSSIAN_CUT_OFF, LOW_THRESHOLD and 
HIGH_THRESHOLD) are removed. Instead, RCFO directly transforms predicates that 
contain the four parameter values into CFQ function invocations and hides those values in 
the private program. For example, the original condition predicate 
magnitude[offset]>=HIGH_THRESHOLD is transformed into CFQ(magnitude[offset]-54, 
L3). The corresponding predicate secret, 696 (HIGH_THRESHOLD-54), is hidden in the 
private program. Here, L3 is a function call site identifier, which uniquely identifies a CFQ 
function invocation. Such a transformation hides critical parameter values into the private 
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program. This effectively defeats static analysis-based reverse engineering attacks and 
raises the bar for dynamic analysis-based reverse engineering attacks (see Section 4.5). For 
simplicity of exposition, here we only transform predicates that contain the algorithmic 
parameter values. In practice, RCFO can transform each predicate to further raise the bar 
for the attacker to understand the algorithm’s details. 
In order to further protect the control flow graph, we propose the fake branch statements 
insertion method (see Section 4.4.2) to complicate the control flow graph. Specifically, we 
generate indistinguishable fake branch statements and insert them into the public program. 
Because each transformed condition, regardless of whether it is genuine or fake, has a 
piece of information (i.e., the predicate secret) hidden in the private cloud, it will be 
difficult for the attacker to distinguish between genuine branch statements and fake branch 
statements. As a result, it is difficult for the attacker to recognize the original algorithm 
from the transformed control flow graph. 
Transforming the condition into a normalized inequality enables the public program to 
reuse existing control flow query results (i.e., return values of the CFQ function 
invocations). Based on this characteristic, we propose the continuous cache (See Section 
4.4.3) to dramatically reduce the number of CFQ function invocations and thus reduce the 
performance overhead. Because the number of cross program queries is reduced, we can 
deploy the private program to a trusted private cloud without incurring significant 
performance overhead and therefore completely separate the private program from the 
attacker. To prevent the attacker from eavesdropping on the CFQ function invocation 
outside of the public program execution node, we propose the CFQ function encryption 
scheme (see Section 4.6.5). To prevent the attacker from passively observing the CFQ 
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function invocation and deriving the predicate secret inside of the public program 
execution node, we propose the loop transformation technique (see Section 4.6.6). We 
prove that, by selecting proper parameters, the loop transformation technique can prevent 
the attacker from distinguishing constant-iteration-number-loops from dynamic loops. 
Compared to existing solutions such as [55][16][51][52][54][64], RCFO segregates 
critical control flow information on the trusted private cloud and raises the bar for static 
and dynamic reverse engineering attacks. Compared to existing distributed solutions 
[15][53], our proposed continuous cache reduces the cross-cloud communication incurred 
by control flow queries and thus reduces the performance overhead. 
Based on the RCFO technique, we developed the system Confidentiality Assurance 
MapReduce (CAMR), which can be applied to existing cloud based MapReduce services, 
such as Amazon Elastic MapReduce (EMR). With CAMR, a user can apply RCFO on 
MapReduce jobs and execute obfuscated jobs on the public cloud. Our experimental results 
in Figure 26 show that the average performance overhead ranges from 14.9% to 33.2% 
when the obfuscation degree increases from 0 to 1.0. 
It is important to note that the application of RCFO is not restricted to cloud-based 
MapReduce services. It is a generalized control flow obfuscation technique that can be 
applied to a wide range of remote execution architectures and different programming 
paradigms. We made further discussion in Section 5.2. 
 
It is necessary to note that RCFO only targets the confidentiality of the control flow. 
Namely, RCFO does not protect the confidentiality of the data processed in the remote 
program execution. For example, in the statement sequence temp=read(confidential); …; 
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print(temp);, confidential information is leaked through the data flow. Such a problem can 
be addressed by data flow protection techniques, which are of the scope of this paper. We 
refer readers to existing works such as [10][11][12][13][14]. 
Compared to IAMR, where the master has to be deployed on the private cloud, CAMR 
does not require the master to be deployed on the private cloud.  In CAMR, RCFO is 
performed offline. After the obfuscation transformation, the user only needs to deploy the 
generated private program to the private cloud. 
An ordinary execution scenario of CAMR is presented in Figure 17. For each original 
program that the cloud user wants to outsource to the cloud, the user first performs RCFO 
offline (step 1). The outcome is two programs: a public program and a private program. 
The public program and the private program are deployed to the public and private cloud, 
respectively (step 2). After that, the public program starts to execute (step 3). Whenever a 
CFQ function is invoked (step 4), the public program will first check the CFQ cache (step 
5). If there is a cache hit, it will return the value from the CFQ cache. Otherwise, it will 
invoke the CFQ function (step 6) on the private cloud. The return value of the CFQ 
function invocation determines the control flow of the public program. Steps 3 through 6 
may be executed repeatedly until the program finishes. 
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Figure 17 Execution Scenario of Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce 
4.3 System Assumptions and Attacker Model 
Based on the system architecture, we make the following system assumptions and 
declare the attacker model. We assume the program obfuscation is performed in a trusted 
environment and is completely opaque to the attacker. The generated private program will 
be sent to the private cloud through a secure channel, such that the private program is 
completely inaccessible to the attacker. 
We assume the private cloud is trusted and well protected. Therefore, the attacker can 
neither access the private program statically nor observe the private program execution 
dynamically. 
However, we assume that the public cloud is not trusted. We assume the worst-case 
situation that the attacker can completely compromise the public cloud. The attacker can be 
a malicious outsider who breaches the defense and breaks into the public cloud. The 
attacker can also be a malicious cloud operator, who abuses her administrative privilege to 
observe or tamper with the cloud user’s program. Specifically, the attacker can perform the 
following attacks on the cloud-based MapReduce architecture depicted in Figure 14. 
1. The attacker can eavesdrop on the communication between the cloud user and the 
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public cloud, shown as attack (1) in Figure 14. 
2. The attacker can access customers’ storage on the public cloud to obtain the 
executable file of the public program, shown as attack (2) in Figure 14. 
3. The attacker can eavesdrop on the data transfer between the storage node and the 
virtual machine, shown as attack (3) in Figure 14. 
4. The attacker can compromise the virtual machine to observe the execution of the 
public program, shown as attack (4) in Figure 14. 
The goal of the attack is to understand the outsourced program’s algorithm. By obtaining 
the public program and/or observing the program execution on the virtual machine, the 
attacker can perform the static analysis and the dynamic tracing to restore the outsourced 
program and, thus, to understand the program’s algorithm. 
In this paper, we focus on protecting the control flow confidentiality of the outsourced 
program. Hence, we assume that its control flow integrity is assured. We can employ 
existing techniques, such as [26][79] to protect the control flow integrity. The ideas of 
[26][79] are to have the remote program report its execution path to the trusted program. If 
the reported execution path deviates from the control flow graph, the trusted program can 
determine that the control flow integrity of the remote program execution is compromised. 
The reader can find further details in [26][79]. In RCFO, the public program invokes the 
CFQ function with the predicate expression value and the call site number. The private 
program can check the sequence of call site numbers against the control flow to determine 
if the public program has violated the control flow integrity. However, the attacker can 
construct a sequence of CFQ function calls that is consistent to the control flow to pass the 
check. To reduce such false negatives, the private program can check if the function 
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invocation’s predicate expression value is within the expected range (i.e., legitimate range 
of the predicate expression). If the attacker uses different values to test a CFQ function, if 
the value is out of the range of the predicate expression, the private program can determine 
that the public program is compromised. 
4.4 Design Details 
The critical component of CAMR is the Runtime Control Flow Obfuscation technique. 
In this section, we will focus on the design detail of RCFO. We will first describe the 
transformation of the original condition, the construction of the fake branch statements, 
and the design of the continuous cache. After that, we will introduce the CFQ function 
encryption and loop transformation technique. Finally, we will discuss the security 
properties of the system design. 
4.4.1 Transforming the Original Condition 
We perform the original condition transformation with the following steps. We first 
extract the condition from each branch statement and transform it into a normalized 
inequality. Then we perform a mathematical transformation on the normalized inequality. 
Finally, we replace the original predicate with a CFQ function call and construct the CFQ 
function implementation in the private program. We discuss details for each step. 
 Condition Normalization 
We extract the condition from each original branch statement and transform it into a 
normal form, which is one or multiple inequalities connected with the Boolean operator 
AND or OR. Each inequality has one of the following two relations: > (greater than) or >= 
(greater or equal). The normalization rule is defined in Figure 18.  
trans(α AND β)  trans(α) AND trans(β) (1) 
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trans(α OR β)  trans(α) OR trans(β) (2) 
trans(δ)  trans(δ==true) (3) 
trans(!δ) trans(δ==false) (4) 
trans(η==θ)  trans((η>=θ)AND(η<=θ)) (5) 
trans(η!=θ)  trans((η>θ)OR(η<θ)) (6) 
trans(η<θ)  (θ>η) (7) 
trans(η<=θ) (θ>=η) (8) 
trans(θ>η) (θ>η) (9) 
trans(θ>=η)(θ>=η) (10) 
Figure 18 Condition Normalization Rule in Original Branch Statement Transformation 
Here we denote α and β as arbitrary expressions and δ, η and θ as “atomic” expressions 
that cannot be further broken down into expressions connected with Boolean operators (i.e., 
AND and OR) or relational operators (i.e., ==, !=, >, >=, <, and <=). We define 
normalization rules as functions named trans. For each condition, the rules are recursively 
applied until no rule can be applied. The resulting expression complies with a normal form. 
To perform the mathematical transformation, we replace the “true” and “false” in rules 
(3) and (4) into numerical values according to the specification of the programing language. 
For example, in the Java language, we transform “true” and “false” into “1” and “0”, 
respectively. Suppose an original condition is ((y<x) AND isAllowed(x)), where y and x are 
two variables and isAllowed() is a function returning a Boolean value. After transformation, 
it can be normalized into a condition ((x>y) AND (isAllowed(x)>=1) AND 
(isAllowed(x)<=1)), via rules (1), (7), (3), (5), (8), (9) and (10).  
Such a normalized inequality format lays the foundation for the mathematical 
transformation (see Section 4.4.1.2) and the continuous cache (see Section 4.4.3). Notice 
that the attacker can still restore the condition by applying simple abstract syntax tree (AST) 
analysis with the current format. However, the mathematical transformation introduced in 
Section 4.4.1.2 and the CFQ function transformation introduced in Section 4.4.1.3 make 
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such an attack difficult.  
 Mathematical Transformation 
We next perform a mathematical transformation on each normalized inequality to 
generate a CFQ predicate. The transformation reorganizes the normalized inequality such 
that the RHS of this inequality only contains a randomly generated number and the other 
terms in the inequality are moved to the LHS. The reorganized inequality is 
mathematically equivalent to the original one. At this point, we have the inequality that the 
LHS is an expression containing program variables and the RHS is a constant value (i.e., 
the random number). We call the LHS expression the predicate expression and the RHS 
value the predicate secret. Due to normalization, the inequality can only have two possible 
relational operators: “>” or “>=”. The goal of such a mathematical transformation is to 
introduce a random number as a predicate secret that can be hidden in the private program. 
We have to note that such a strategy also works for predicates that only contain variables 
or function calls. For example, suppose an original predicate is x>y; by generating the 
predicate secret as 5, we can transform the inequality into x-y+5>5. In this case, although 
the predicate secret value, 5, is displayed in the CFQ predicate expression, the attacker 
cannot conclude that the exposed number is the predicate secret because she does not know 
the original predicate. 
 CFQ Function Construction 
With the transformed inequality, we construct the CFQ function invocation and the CFQ 
function implementation as follows. We replace each inequality with a CFQ function 
invocation. It takes two parameters: the predicate expression and the call site identifier. 
The call site identifier is a number uniquely identifying the current CFQ function 
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invocation and is used to look up the predicate secret in the private program. 
We replace each transformed inequality with the generated CFQ function invocation in 
the public program, and send the relational operator and the predicate secret to the private 
program to construct the CFQ function implementation. When the CFQ function is 
invoked, it looks up the relational operator and the predicate secret via the passed function 
call site identifier. The function returns true if the passed predicate expression value and 
the predicate secret satisfy the relational operator, and vice versa. 
Because each transformed CFQ predicate is mathematically equivalent to the original 
predicate, the behavior of the transformed program is not changed. We show a 
transformation example in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19 Example of Transforming Normalized Condition 
Suppose a normalized inequality is x+5>y, the transformation selects a random number 
as the predicate secret (i.e., 23) and generates the inequality x-y+28>23. The normalized 
Normalized inequality: 
x+5>y
Select predicate secret as 23, reorganize the inequality:
x-y+28>23
Transform to CFQ function call in public program:
CFQ(x-y+28, L1)
Generate private program with
 call site identifier, 
relational operator 
and predicate secret: 
<L1: ">" :23>
Original Predicate
y<x+5
//Private program
CFQ(pred_exp_val, call_site_id){
    switch(call_site_id){
        case "L1":
            return pred_exp_val>23;
       ......
    }
}
Invoke
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inequality is replaced with a CFQ function invocation in the public program. The predicate 
secret 23 and the relational operator “>” are sent to the private program, indexed by the call 
site identifier L1. The invocation of the function CFQ(pred_exp_val, call_site_id) passes 
the value of the predicate expression x-y+28 and the function call site identifier L1 as 
parameters. When the CFQ function is invoked, the function looks up the predicate secret 
and the relational operator corresponding to call_site_id and returns the comparison result. 
4.4.2 Inserting Fake Branch Statements 
To further obfuscate the original program, we also insert fake branch statements in the 
public program.  
It takes three steps to complete the fake branch statement insertion. We first perform data 
flow analysis on the original program to evaluate the variable value range for each 
statement. After that, we construct fake branch statements based on the evaluated variable 
value range and insert the fake branch statements into the original program. Because the 
fake branch predicate is derived from the original branch predicate, we propose expression 
relaxation and expression aggregation to hide such a derivation relationship to confuse the 
attacker. Finally, we apply the condition transformation method discussed in Section 4.4.1 
to transform the fake branch condition into the CFQ condition. In this section, we only 
discuss the first two steps because the last step was covered previously in Section 4.4.1. 
 Variable Range Evaluation 
We perform an intra-procedural data flow analysis on each original program function to 
evaluate the variable ranges. We are interested in the question “What are the ranges of 
variables in the current procedure when a statement is about to be executed?” The 
evaluated variables in each statement are not restricted to the ones that appear in the current 
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statement; they can be any variable defined in the current procedure, as long as such the 
variable is within the scope of the current statement. We do not require the resulting 
variable ranges to be accurate. Yet we require the resulting variable range not violate its 
runtime value. In other words, the evaluated range can be gross. For example, suppose a 
variable x is evaluated as x>5 in our evaluation. If its actual exact range is x>100, we still 
think such evaluation is acceptable. This is because using x>5 or x>100 as the condition 
will return the same Boolean value at runtime. Therefore, it will not change the runtime 
control flow. In addition, x>5 will not reveal the exact variable range, which is implied 
from the original control flow predicate. Therefore, a gross evaluation of variables helps 
the obfuscation. 
The variable evaluation for each statement is represented in the form of a range set. Each 
element in the set is a relation triple, with the format <left expression, relational operator, 
right expression>. The relation triple supports six relational operators: >, >=, <, <=, ==, 
and !=. The left and right expressions can be any variable expression, including variables, 
function calls, and constants. 
The variable evaluation is derived from the original branch conditions. We first perform 
normalization on the original branch condition to convert it into relation triples. The 
normalization is similar to the trans function defined in Figure 18. However because the 
relation triple can contain <, <=, == and != (compared to the condition normalization, 
which only contains “>” and “>=”), this normalization only needs to apply rules (1) 
through (4) from Figure 18. Based on the relation triples, we perform a forward data flow 
analysis to propagate the relationship information to the succeeding statements and 
accumulate the range set for each statement. The analysis is complete when it reaches a 
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fixed point, i.e., the range set for each statement does not change. The analysis algorithm is 
shown in Figure 20.  
//Init range set for each statement in procedure P 
func range_set_init(proc P){ 
        for (stmt s in proc P){  
                R_in[s] = {}; 
                R_out[s][] = {}; 
        } 
} 
//Range set accumulate for each statement s 
func range_set_accumulate(stmt s, list<range_set> R_out_pred){ 
  R_in = intersection(R_out_pred); 
  R_in[s] = union(R_in[s],R_in); 
  R_out = prune(R_in[s], s); 
  if(s is a branch statement){ 
    for(stmt o in s.next_stmt) 
      R_out[s][o]=intersection(R_out, extract_range_set(s,o)); 
  }else{ 
    o = s.next_stmt; 
    R_out[s][o] = R_out; 
  } 
} 
//Forward traverse to update the range set  
func get_variable_range_set(proc P){ 
  range_set_init(P); 
  it = P.get_forward_traverse_iterator(); 
  while(it.has_next()){ 
    s = it.next(); 
    R_in_prev = R_in[s]; 
    range_set_accumulate(s, R_out[s.pred_list]); 
    if(R_in[s]==R_in_prev) 
      break; //fix point reached 
  } 
} 
Figure 20 Variable Range Evaluation Algorithm 
We use two arrays to record the incoming and outgoing range set for each statement. 
R_in[s] records the range set before s is executed, and R_out[s][] records the range set 
after s is executed. Because a branch statement can have two or more successors and 
different successors can have different variable ranges, we use a two-dimensional array to 
record the outgoing range set. The entire analysis is controlled in the function 
get_variable_range_set. It accepts a procedure P as input and accumulates the evaluated 
variable ranges for each statement in P. It first calls the range_set_init function to initialize 
the range set of each statement as empty. After that, it traverses the program statements 
through its control flow. When a statement is visited, the function range_set_accumulate is 
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called to update its incoming and outgoing range set. When the analysis reaches a fixed 
point, it terminates. 
The function range_set_accumulate takes the statement s and the outgoing range sets of 
its predecessors R_out_pred as arguments and updates the incoming and outgoing range 
sets of the statement s. It first merges the evaluations of its predecessors’ outgoing range 
sets by calculating their intersection, which is stored in set R_in. After that, it updates the 
incoming range set of statement s by performing a union on the old incoming R_in[s] and 
R_in. To compute the outgoing range set, it first prunes R_in[s] if statement s may modify 
the value of the variables, which are evaluated in the range set. The pruning is conservative. 
It includes: 
• If s is an assignment statement and the LHS of s is a variable in R_in[s], the 
evaluation about the variable in R_in[s] is pruned. 
• If s contains a function call and a parameter of the function call is a variable in 
R_in[s], the evaluation about the variable in R_in[s] is pruned. This is because, 
inside the function, the value of the variable can be changed.  
If s is not a branch statement, the pruning result will be the outgoing range set of s. 
Otherwise, the outgoing range set has to be updated by an intersection of the pruning result 
and the branch condition range evaluation, which is computed in the function 
extract_range_set. The extract_range_set function returns the relation triples based on the 
passed branch statement condition and the outgoing branch. For example, if a branch 
statement is if(x>5) x++; else x--;, and the relation triple is x>5. The extract_range_set 
function returns x>5 for the true branch and x<=5 for the false branch.  
When the analysis completes, the range sets in the array of R_in[] are the variable 
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evaluation results for each statement. 
 Fake Branch Statement Insertion 
We can insert a fake branch statement before each original statement if its variable 
evaluation result is not empty. We call such original statements insertion candidates. 
However, we need to generate a fake condition for each insertion candidate first. To 
generate a fake condition for an insertion candidate, we first normalize each resulting 
relation triple in the variable evaluation into an expression with one of the following 
formats: LHS>RHS, LHS>=RHS, LHS==RHS or LHS!=RHS (here we only need to apply 
rules (7) and (8) from Figure 18 to normalize the LHS<RHS and LHS<=RHS inequalities). 
After that, we perform the expression aggregation and the expression relaxation on those 
expressions to generate a series of indistinguishable fake predicates. Finally, we randomly 
select several fake predicates and connect them with the Boolean operator AND or OR to 
form a fake condition. To generate more genuine-seeming fake branch statements, we 
construct the fake branch statement using either the generated fake condition or the 
negation of the fake condition. If we use the generated fake condition, the true branch of 
the fake branch statement goes to the original next statement, and the false branch goes to a 
randomly chosen statement in the current procedure. If we use the negation of the fake 
condition, the false branch goes to the original next statement, and the true branch goes to a 
randomly chosen statement. 
The expression aggregation technique can be performed on any two expressions with the 
format LHS>RHS, LHS>=RHS or LHS==RHS. With two such expressions, we perform 
addition on the LHS and RHS and adjust the relational operator according to the inequality 
addition properties. If one expression has the format LHS==RHS, the generated expression 
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will have the same relational operator as the other expression. If no expression is in the 
format LHS==RHS and one expression is in the format LHS>RHS, the generated relational 
operator will be >. If both expressions are in the format LHS>=RHS, the generated 
expression will have the relational operator >=. 
The expression relaxation technique can be performed on an expression with the format 
LHS>RHS or LHS>=RHS to further “relax” the expression relationship. For an expression 
with one of above formats, we “relax” the inequality by adding a random number to the 
LHS. We call the constant number the relax value. For the expression with the format 
LHS>RHS, we can also “relax” it to LHS>=RHS. 
For each insertion candidate, we can apply expression aggregation and expression 
relaxation to any subset of its evaluation range set. The two techniques can also be applied 
repeatedly in an arbitrary order. As a result, we can generate a series of different fake 
predicates for each insertion candidate. For each insertion candidate, the obfuscator can 
insert more than one fake branch statements before it to further confuse the attacker. 
To make a tradeoff between the obfuscation effect and the performance overhead, we 
insert a fake branch statement before each insertion candidate with a certain probability, 
which we call the obfuscation degree, denoted as d. The value of the obfuscation degree 
ranges from 0 to 1.0. A higher obfuscation degree means that a fake branch statement is 
inserted before an insertion candidate with a higher probability. For example, for the 
TeraSort application used in the experiment in Section 4.7, the number of original 
statements is 351. Out of the 351 original statements, 23 are branch statements. After 
variable range analysis, we can find 76 insertion candidates. When d is set to 0, no fake 
branch statements are inserted in the program. When d is set to 0.5, 38 fake branch 
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statements are inserted. When d is set to 1.0, 76 fake branch statements are inserted. Setting 
a higher obfuscation degree makes the program control flow graph more complicated, but 
it also incurs more CFQ function invocations on the fake branch statements. Fortunately, 
the continuous cache (introduced in Section 4.4.3) helps us effectively reduce the number 
of remote CFQ function invocations. Our experimental results in Figure 26 show that, 
when the obfuscation degree increases from 0 to 1.0, the performance overheads of the four 
applications do not increase significantly. Among the four applications, the maximum 
performance overhead increase occurs in the application TeraGen, whose performance 
overhead increases from 15.8% to 62.6%. The average performance overhead increase in 
the four applications is 18.3%. 
After expression relaxation and aggregation, the variable range of the generated fake 
predicate is a superset of the actual runtime range for the variable expression. Therefore, 
the inserted fake condition will not alter the runtime control flow. 
An example of fake branch statement insertion is shown in Figure 21. Suppose the range 
set for statement L8 is evaluated to be 1) x>6 and 2) 45>y. By applying expression 
aggregation to 1) and 2) and applying expression relaxation with a relax value of 2, we 
obtain x+45+2>y+6. By choosing the predicate secret as 4, we obtain x-y+45>4. We 
transform the expression into the CFQ condition CFQ(x-y+45, L7), where L7 is the 
function call site identifier, and send L7, “>” and the predicate secret 4 to the private 
program. The obfuscator randomly chooses a statement L2 as the false branch statement 
target and constructs a false branch statement (e.g., goto L2). At runtime, the generated 
CFQ condition is always evaluated as true. Thus, the false branch will never be triggered. 
 
L2: 
//Original program  
y=y-2; 
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L8: 
    …… 
//Range evaluation: 1) x>6; 2) y<45 
z = x+y;  
 
L2: 
 
L7: 
L8: 
//Public program  
y=y-2; 
    …… 
if(CFQ(x-y+45, L7)) 
  z=x+y; 
else goto L2; 
Figure 21 Example of Inserting Fake Condition 
4.4.3 Speed up Control Flow Queries with the Continuous Cache 
Because the predicate secret is stored in the private cloud, a straightforward 
implementation of the CFQ function that queries control flow cross-cloud incurs 
significant performance overhead. Hence, we design a continuous cache to mitigate such 
overhead. In our design, the public and the private programs both implement the CFQ 
function, resulting in the public CFQ function and the private CFQ function, respectively. 
The private CFQ function implements the actual control flow query, while the public CFQ 
function maintains a continuous cache to store the ranges of parameters that make the 
private CFQ function returns true/false. When the public program invokes the CFQ 
function, the public CFQ function is firstly invoked. It queries the continuous cache. If a 
cache hit occurs, the public CFQ function returns the cached value. Otherwise, it invokes 
the private CFQ function and updates the continuous cache. 
Because the CFQ function only accepts two relational operators, “>” and “>=”, we 
design the continuous cache as follows. For each CFQ function call site, it records the 
ranges of the predicate expression values that make the CFQ function return true/false. 
Based on the relationship of the new predicate expression value and the cached predicate 
expression value range, the cache determines whether a private CFQ function call is 
needed. The design of the continuous cache is shown in Figure 22.  
  96
 
Figure 22 The Design of Continuous Cache 
For each CFQ function call site, the continuous cache stores two numbers in the public 
program: the current smallest predicate expression value that makes the CFQ function 
return true (which we call the true bound), and the current greatest predicate expression 
value that makes the CFQ function return false (which we call the false bound). When a 
new predicate expression value is fed into a continuous cache to be looked up, it will be 
compared with the true bound and the false bound. If the new value is greater than the true 
bound, the continuous cache returns true. If the new value is smaller than the false bound, 
the cache returns false. If the new value is between the true bound and the false bound, the 
private CFQ function is invoked. If the private CFQ function returns true, the new 
predicate expression value becomes the smallest known value that makes the CFQ function 
return true. Therefore the true bound is updated with the new value. Otherwise, the false 
bound is updated with the new value. 
Each CFQ function invocation only needs to keep two values (i.e., the true bound and the 
false bound) in the continuous cache. Suppose a transformed public program contains N 
branch statements; because each condition in the branch statement is transformed into a 
CFQ function invocation, the continuous cache only needs to maintain N×2 values in total. 
Therefore the space complexity of the continuous cache is O(N).  
We define the cache-hit rate of the continuous cache as the ratio of the private CFQ 
Predicate Secret-Infinity +Infinityfalse_bound true_bound
Returns trueReturns false
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function invocations to the public CFQ function invocations. When the CFQ expression 
value of a CFQ function falls between its true bound and false bound, a private CFQ 
function will be invoked. The invocation of the private CFQ function will update the true 
bound or the false bound, which reduces the range between the true bound and the false 
bound. If the sequence of the CFQ expression values is randomly distributed, as time goes 
by, the range between the true bound and the false bound will be reduced, and the 
probability of the next expression value falling into this range will also be reduced. Hence, 
the cache-hit rate is increasing. However, the sequence of the CFQ expression values is 
usually not randomly distributed. It is determined by the control flow of the outsourced 
program. Given the variety of the outsourced program control flow, making a quantitative 
analysis on the cache-hit rate is difficult. Therefore, we only measure the cache-hit rate 
through experiments. Our experiments in TABLE 11 counts the number of private and 
public CFQ function invocations and computes the cache-hit rate. It shows that the 
continuous cache dramatically reduces the number of private CFQ function invocation. 
According to TABLE 11, the lowest cache-hit rate the continuous cache experienced was 
90.47%. In the four MapReduce applications, most tasks can achieve a cache-hit rate of 
over 99%. 
 
4.4.4 CFQ Function Encryption 
To prevent the attacker from wiretapping the private CFQ function invocation, we 
protect the parameters and the return values of CFQ function invocations with symmetric 
encryption. The symmetric encryption key is generated in the public program, encrypted 
by a public key encryption scheme and is sent to the private program. The protocol is 
  98
shown in Figure 23.  
 
Figure 23 CFQ Function Encryption 
In the offline obfuscation, RCFO generates an asymmetric public key pair Kpub and Kpriv 
and sends them to the public and private programs, respectively (step 0). When the public 
program starts to execute, it first creates a symmetric key (Ksym) from a randomly generated 
number (step 1), encrypts it with Kpub, and sends it to the private program (step 2). The 
private program obtains Ksym by decrypting the received message with Kpriv (step 3). At this 
point, the public program and the private program agree to encrypt the CFQ function call 
parameters and returns with the symmetric key Ksym. To prevent the known plaintext attack, 
we add a randomly generated nonce in each encryption of the CFQ function invocation and 
return. By doing so, the cypher text always appears different even if the parameter values 
(or the return values) are the same.  
4.4.5 Loop Transformation 
If the attacker is able to compromise the virtual machine, she can perform dynamic 
Original 
Program
Public Program
(Kpub)
Private Program
(Kpriv)
0. RCFO Transformation
(Generate Kpub and Kpriv)
2. EKpub(Ksym)
3. Decrypt EKpub(Ksym) with DKpriv, get Ksym
4. CFQ(EKsym(Pred_Exp, L#, nonce1))
6. EKsym(CFQ function call return, nonce2)
5. Decrypt Parameters with Ksym
Compute CFQ function invocation
CFQ function
encryption key
establishment
CFQ function
invocation
1. Ksym <-- Random ()
7. Decrypt CFQ function call return with Ksym
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tracing on the public program. When a loop in the public program contains a constant 
number of iterations and the loop variable increases or decreases continuously, the attacker 
can observe the CFQ function invocation and restore the control flow of the loop. For 
example, suppose an original program snippet is as shown in Figure 24 a); even though the 
program is transformed into the CFQ function invocation format, the attacker can still 
observe the value of variable i. When she observes that the CFQ function return changes 
from true to false when i increases from 2 to 3, she can infer that the original condition can 
be i<3 or i<=2. 
To mitigate such an attack, we propose the loop transformation technique. The intuition 
is as follows: instead of having the loop variable (i.e., i in Figure 24 a)) increase 
continuously (i.e., with an increasing step of 1), we set the loop variable increasing step to 
be a dynamically generated value. But we keep the loop iteration number the same as 
before. We give a concrete example later in this section. To hide the step generation 
procedure, we generate the loop variable increasing step through another loop and protect 
the loop condition with CFQ function invocation. To be clear, we call the original loop the 
main loop. We call the loop that generates the loop variable increasing step the step 
generation loop. The step generation loop repeatedly reduces a variable related to the input 
data by a constant value until the loop condition is no longer satisfied. Because we hide the 
loop condition with the CFQ function invocation, it is difficult for the attacker to derive the 
exact loop step value. Hence, it is difficult for the attacker to understand the original loop 
condition. 
a) 
 //Original Program 
for(int i =0; i<3; i++){ 
     …… 
     print(i); 
} 
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b) 
 //Loop Transformation: select K=380, U=180, Δ=50, func(var)>180 
int j = func(var);  
int x=0, p=0; 
while(j>180) 
    j-=50; 
…… 
while(x<380){ 
    x+=j; 
    …… 
    print(p); 
    p++; 
} 
c) 
 
 
 
L1: 
 
 
L2: 
 
 
//Loop Transformation with CFQ function 
int j = func(var); 
int x=0, p=0; 
while(CFQ(j-78, L1)) // predicate secret is 102 
    j-=Δ; 
…… 
while(CFQ(125-x, L2)){//predicate secret is -255  
    x+=j; 
    …… 
    print(p); 
    p++; 
} 
d) 
 //Loop Transformation, assuming the loop iteration number is n 
//Generate random number Δ. (n+1)×Δ>U>n×Δ, and U×(n-1)<K<(U-Δ)×n. 
int j = func(var); 
//Step generation loop.  
while(j>U) 
    j-=Δ; 
…… 
while(x<K){ 
    x+=j; 
    …… 
} 
Figure 24 Example of Loop Transformation 
The loop transformation procedure is shown in Figure 24 d). Suppose the original loop 
runs for a constant number of iterations, marked as n. We generate the constant numbers U, 
Δ and K as the loop transformation parameters and perform the transformation as follows. 
We introduce a variable j to hold the main loop variable increasing step. We initialize the 
value of j as a dynamically generated number. We insert a step generation loop before the 
main loop. The step generation loop reduces the value of variable j by Δ in each iteration, 
until the resulting variable is smaller than U. To be clear, we mark the initial value of j as j0 
and mark the resulting value of j after the step generation loop as j´. The resulting value of 
j´ will be a dynamic number between U and U-Δ. We introduce a new loop variable x in the 
main loop, initialize it to 0 and transform the main loop such that it increments x by j´ in 
each iteration until the resulting variable is greater than K. 
To prevent the attacker from performing pattern matching-based attacks (e.g., using the 
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pattern of decrementing j in the step generation loop as a hallmark to identify loop 
transformations), we can perform mathematical manipulations to hide the operation of 
decrementing variable j. We can also apply existing obfuscation techniques [22][23][24] to 
transform the step generation loop. For example, we can apply the variable encoding 
technique [23] to replace j with the negation of another variable, say l, and thus to replace 
the decrementing of j with the incrementing of l. Even further, we can replace the entire 
step generation loop with other implementations as long as the resulting value j´ is within 
the range of U and U-Δ. 
To make the transformed loop preserve the original loop functionality, we have to select 
the values of j0, U, Δ, and K carefully. Specifically, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 11. To preserve the functionality of the original loop, we have to ensure that j0, 
j´, U, Δ and K satisfy the following formulas: 
j0>U                                                                                    (10) 
U-Δ<j´≤U                                                                                (11) 
U>Δ×n                                                                                  (12) 
U×(n-1)<K≤(U-Δ)×n                                                                     (13) 
 
Proof: For the step generation loop, we need to ensure that j´ is within the range (U-Δ, U] 
(i.e., formula (11)). To achieve that, we only need to ensure j0>U, i.e., the return value of 
function func(var) is greater than U (formula (10)).  
For the main loop, we need to set the condition such that the main loop returns true prior 
to the nth iteration and returns false in the nth iteration. For any value of j´, the value of the 
main loop iteration variable (i.e., x in Figure 24 d)) is (n-1)×j´ after the (n-1)th iteration and 
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is n×j´ after the nth iteration. Therefore, by selecting K between (n-1)×j´ and n×j´ for any j´, 
we can preserve the functionality of the original loop. Because j´ is within the range of 
(U-Δ, U], when j´ is U-Δ, the range of K is ((U-Δ)×(n-1), (U-Δ)×n]; when j´ is U, the range 
of K is (U×(n-1), U×n]. To ensure the value of K to be selected within the range of 
((n-1)×j´, n×j´] for any j´, we have to ensure that the two ranges of K overlap, and K is 
selected from the overlapping range. I.e., (U-Δ)×n>U×(n-1) and U×(n-1)<K≤(U-Δ)×n. 
By simplifying the inequality, we obtain formulas (12) and (13). 
From the attacker’s perspective, she may find that one hallmark of the loop 
transformation is formula (12), i.e., U>Δ× n. The attacker may derive the range of U from 
dynamic tracing and verify if formula (12) is satisfied. If true, she can recognize the loop as 
an artifact of loop transformation, rather than an ordinary dynamic loop. However, we 
prove that, by carefully setting the transformation parameter U and Δ, we can defeat such 
an attack. 
Theorem 12.  By setting U and Δ to satisfy the following constraint, the attacker is unable 
to decide whether formula (12) is satisfied or not by analyzing the range of U. 
Therefore, we raise the bar for distinguishing loop transformations from regular 
dynamic loops. 
U<Δ×(n+1)                                                                             (14) 
Proof: From the attacker’s perspective, if she can dynamically observe the program 
execution, she can observe the resulting main loop step value j´ and count the iteration 
number n. Because the value of Δ is exposed in the public program, she can derive the 
approximate range of U based on j´ and Δ. Given formula (11), the attacker has the range of 
U as 
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j´≤U<j´+Δ                                                                            (15) 
The attacker can perform the following algorithm to determine if formula (12) is satisfied 
and thus determine whether the current loop is an artifact of the loop transformation: 
1) For any j´∈(U-Δ, U], if j´>Δ×n, then U≥j´>Δ×n (by formula (15)) for all j´s. The 
current loop is an artifact of the loop transformation (by formula (12)). In other 
words, for any j´, if formula (12) is satisfied, then the current loop is an artifact of 
the loop transformation. 
2) If there exists a j´∈(U-Δ, U], such that j´+Δ≤Δ×n, then U<j´+Δ≤Δ×n (by 
formula (15)) for some j´s. The current loop is not an artifact of the loop 
transformation (by formula (12)). In other words, if there exists a j´ that makes 
formula (12) unsatisfied, the current loop is not an artifact of the loop 
transformation. 
3) Otherwise, there is an uncertainty. In other words, if the attacker finds j´<Δ×n for 
some j´, she is not sure whether it satisfies formula (12) or not. Therefore, she is 
not sure whether the current loop is an artifact of the loop transformation or a real 
dynamic loop. 
We can set the values of U and Δ properly to make the attacker fall into case 3). Because 
U-Δ<j´≤U (formula (11)), by setting U-Δ<Δ×n, we can make some j´∈(U-Δ, Δ×n) smaller 
than Δ×n. Simplifying it, we obtain U<Δ×(n+1). Therefore, by satisfying formula (14), we 
make the attacker unable to determine whether formula (12) is satisfied or not after 
analyzing the range of U.                                                                               
By satisfying the constraints in Theorem 11 and Theorem 12 (formulas (10) through 
(14)), we ensure that the loop transformation preserves the original program’s function and 
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make it difficult for the attacker to distinguish the loop transformation from an real 
dynamic loop. We propose the following algorithm to select the loop transformation 
parameters. 
Loop Transformation Parameter Generation (LTPG) Algorithm: Suppose the 
original loop iteration number is a constant value n, we select the loop transformation 
parameters as follows to satisfy formulas (10) through (14). 
Step 1. Select a random positive number Δ. 
Step 2. Select a random positive number U such that Δ×(n+1)>U>Δ×n (to satisfy 
formula (12) and (14)).  
Step 3. Construct a function func(var), which takes an arbitrary non-zero-value 
variable in the current function as the argument and returns a number j0>U 
(to satisfy formula (10)). If no variable is available for the argument of func, 
we generate a random number to feed the function func(var). The 
implementation of func(var) can be arbitrary, as long as the return value is 
greater than U. We describe our implementation in CAMR in Section 
4.6.6. 
Step 4. Select a random number K within the range (U×(n-1), (U-Δ)×n] (to satisfy 
formula (13)). 
Figure 24 b) shows the program after the loop transformation on Figure 24 a). Here, we 
choose Δ as 50, according to step 1) in the LTPG algorithm. Because n=3, we select U as 
180, according to step 2). Accordingly, we select K as 380, according to step 4). Figure 24 
c) shows the transformed program protected by the CFQ function. Because the original 
loop body contains a statement that involves the loop variable (print(i);), we introduce a 
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variable p and maintain it in the transformed main loop body to preserve the original 
program behavior. 
Essentially, the format of the main loop condition after the transformation is unchanged: 
x<K (in Figure 24 d)), where x is the loop variable, and K is a constant value. However, 
different obfuscations will result in different constant values of K. The transformation also 
makes the loop increasing step j´ a dynamic value generated based on a variable value in 
the current function. From the appearance, because the loop increasing step j´ is a dynamic 
value and K is a constant value, different values of j´ may incur different iteration numbers. 
For example, suppose K is 380; j´=10 will incur 38 iterations, while j´=38 will incur 10 
iterations. Therefore, from the appearance, the iteration number is determined dynamically, 
which makes the transformed loop appear to be a dynamic loop. At runtime, the main loop 
variable increasing step j´ is dynamically generated based on the output of func(var). 
Accordingly, the main loop variable value is dynamically computed. Take Figure 24 b) as 
an example; if func(var) returns 300, after the step generation loop, the resulting j´ will be 
150. The value sequence of x in the main loop is 0, 150, 300, 450. If func(var) returns 181, 
after the loop step generation loop, the resulting j´ will be 131. The value sequence of x in 
the main loop is 0, 131, 262 and 393. Because K is set to 380, both main loop executions 
will iterate three times. 
If the attacker performs taint analysis [25], she will find that the iteration number of the 
main loop is related to a variable in the current function, rather than a constant value. 
Therefore it is hard for her to connect such a dynamic loop with a 
constant-iteration-number-loop.  
If the attacker performs pattern matching to discover the transformed loop, she will find 
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that the format of the step generation loop and the main loop are not significantly different 
from any common dynamic loops. Besides, the aforementioned mathematical and 
obfuscation skills will hide the pattern of step generation loop. Hence, it is hard for her to 
discover the transformed loop through static analysis.  
If the attacker performs dynamic tracing, because the loop conditions (the step 
generation loop and the main loop) are protected by the CFQ function, she cannot tell 
whether the current loop is an artifact of the loop transformation by deriving the range of 
the loop transformation parameter, as proven in Theorem 12. 
Our proposed solution is to transform loops whose loop variables monotonically increase. 
With minor modification, it can also be applied to loops where the loop variables 
monotonically decrease. Such a modification is straightforward and we skip the discussion 
due to the limited space.  
We have to note that the loop transformation technique only works on loops with a 
constant number of iterations. It cannot protect dynamic loops because we can only hide a 
constant number in the private program. With a constant iteration number n, we can 
generate constant values of U and K and hide them in the private program. However, with a 
dynamic iteration number, we cannot generate constant values of U and K to preserve the 
original loop functionality. 
4.5 Security Discussion 
RCFO raises the bar for static analysis attacks. Firstly, CFQ predicates hide part of the 
control flow in the private cloud. When original conditions are transformed into CFQ 
conditions, predicate secrets (which determine the control flow) are stored in the private 
cloud. To the attacker who can access the public program, the control flow information is 
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not complete. Hence, static analysis on the public program alone does not give the attacker 
enough information about the control flow. Secondly, the inserted fake branch statements 
complicate the control flow graph and further confuse the attacker. The inserted fake 
branch statements are indistinguishable from the original branch statements and thus hide 
the real branch statements among the fake branch statements. From the appearance, a fake 
branch condition has the same CFQ condition format as that of the transformed original 
branch conditions. Although each fake branch condition is derived from the variable 
evaluation of the original condition, the expression aggregation and relaxation can reduce 
the correlation of the fake branch condition and the original branch condition. In addition, 
hiding predicate secrets in the private program makes it more difficult for the attacker to 
infer the who-derives-who relationship. 
RCFO also raises the bar for dynamic analysis attacks. Firstly, the attacker cannot 
perform dynamic analysis offline. This is because, to observe the execution status of the 
public program, the private program has to collaborate with the public program. Because 
the private program is completely controlled by the cloud user, the attacker can only 
perform dynamic tracing when the cloud user sets up the private program. 
Due to the CFQ function encryption, the attacker cannot eavesdrop on CFQ function 
invocations outside of virtual machines. This prevents the attacker outside of virtual 
machines from dynamically tracing the program. The attacker has to break into virtual 
machines to perform dynamic tracing attacks. However, breaking the public cloud security 
defense is not easy. Even if the attacker is able to compromise virtual machines and 
dynamically trace virtual machine executions, RCFO still offers multiple lines of defense. 
If the attacker performs dynamic tracing attacks on the program, she can obtain 
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information by observing the arguments and the return values of CFQ function invocations. 
However, such tracing information can only give the attacker vague information about 
original predicates. Suppose the attacker observes that a CFQ function call CFQ(x+9, L1) 
returns true when x is 19; the attacker can infer that the original predicate could be x>n, 
where n<=19 or n<19. However, she cannot further understand the exact value of n 
without other information. 
The attacker may perform brute force attacks. For instance, suppose a CFQ function call 
is CFQ(x+9, L1). The attacker can repeatedly call this CFQ function with continuously 
increased values of x until the function’s return value changes from false to true. In this 
case, the attacker can guess that the very value of x that triggers the change is related to the 
predicate secret. Because we assume the control flow integrity is protected by the remote 
attestation techniques in Section 4.3, such an attack will be detected if the call site sequence 
in the CFQ function invocations violates the control flow check in the private program. 
 
The attacker may passively observe every CFQ function invocation. If she finds the 
expression variable value of a CFQ function increases/decreases continuously, she can 
derive the predicate secret, as described in Section 4.4.5. The loop transformation 
introduced in Section 4.4.5 transforms the loop with a constant number of iterations into a 
dynamic loop, so that the loop variable increasing step is dynamically generated. Because 
the conditions of step generation loops are protected by the CFQ function, by carefully 
selecting transformation parameters, it is difficult for the attacker to distinguish 
transformed loops from ordinary dynamic loops. The detailed analysis can be found in 
Section 4.4.5. 
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Finally, the attacker may perform dynamic tracing to mark unexecuted branches as fake 
branches. Such a method is risky to the attacker because it could incur false positives due to 
the incompleteness of dynamic analysis. As a result, the attacker may mistakenly 
categorize the un-triggered genuine branch as a fake branch. 
4.6 System Implementation 
We have developed a prototype system called CAMR to perform RCFO on Apache 
Hadoop (a popular MapReduce implementation) jobs. Our experiments show that CAMR 
can protect MapReduce jobs running on Amazon Elastic MapReduce (Amazon EMR), a 
popular cloud-based MapReduce service.  
To implement the obfuscation system, we use Soot [20], an open source Java-based 
compiler tool, to perform program analysis and program transformations. We use Symja 
[19], an open source Java-based computer algebra system, to perform mathematical 
transformation. CAMR reads Java .class files and generates obfuscated Java .class files. 
Hence, our tool can directly obfuscate Hadoop job files without the source code.  
4.6.1 Condition Transformation 
The transformation is performed in the gb phase of Soot analysis. To transform original 
conditions into CFQ conditions, we use Soot to extract the condition in each of the branch 
statement and perform condition normalization with the rule presented in Figure 18. The 
generated inequalities are represented in Soot expression objects. To manipulate the 
inequality, we translate Soot expression objects into string-based arithmetic expressions 
and send them to Symja. Because Symja can only perform arithmetic operations, we 
translate the arithmetic operator in the Soot expression object into a Symja operator and 
translate other operations that Symja does not recognize or will misunderstand into Symja 
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variables. For instance, when we have a Soot expression x+func(y), we translate it into 
x+funcLBRyRBR. Here, “(” and “)” are keywords in Symja script. However, they are used 
in Symja to represent arithmetic operation priorities, rather than function calls. Thus we 
replace them with “LBR” and “RBR”, respectively. 
Symja takes a string representing an arithmetic inequality as input and returns another 
string representing the reorganized inequality as output. The reorganization is described in 
Section 4.4.1.2. The LHS of the returned inequality is the predicate expression. The RHS is 
the predicate secret. From the RHS of the inequality, we extract the predicate secret and 
write it in a file, along with the inequality relational operator (i.e., “>” or “>=”). This file 
will be sent to the private cloud and loaded by the private program. From the LHS, we 
parse the string as an abstract syntax tree so that we can extract the predicate expression 
and convert it back to a Soot expression object.  
After that, Soot replaces the original condition with the CFQ condition. Specifically, it 
replaces each inequality in the transformed predicate with an invocation to the CFQ 
function. The function call takes two parameters: the extracted predicate expression and 
the function call site identifier. The function call site identifier is a string consisting of the 
current class name, the current function name and a unique number in the current function 
to identify the function call. By using such a nomenclature for the function call site 
identifier, we guarantee that each function call site identifier is unique. 
4.6.2 Fake Branch Statement Insertion 
To insert fake branch statements, we use Soot to perform two rounds of program scans. 
In the first round, we perform intra-procedural forward data flow analysis on each function 
of the original program. The implementation is the same as the algorithm described in 
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Figure 20. The generated result is stored in an array. Each element in the array is the 
variable evaluation of a statement in the original program. 
In the second round, we generate a fake branch predicate for each insertion candidate. 
For each insertion candidate, we pick the corresponding variable evaluation and perform 
expression relaxation and aggregation as described in Section 4.4.2.2. Because the variable 
evaluation is represented in Soot expression objects, we translate it into a string that applies 
Symjas syntax and performs expression relaxation and aggregation in Symja. After that, 
we translate the generated string back into a Soot expression object and construct the fake 
branch statement with the generated expression object. 
4.6.3 Private Program Implementation 
According to Section 4.6.1, each call site identifier contains the program class and 
function information. This makes the CFQ function invocation universally unique so that 
multiple public programs can share one private program. Therefore, our implementation 
only deploys one private program on the private cloud for all MapReduce jobs. Whenever a 
MapReduce job is obfuscated, the predicate secrets, the inequality operators and the call 
site identifiers are sent to the private program. The private program loads such information 
for the private CFQ function to look up. Whenever the private CFQ function is invoked, it 
first looks up the predicate secret and the inequality operator by the passed call site 
identifier. Then it compares the passed predicate expression value with the predicate secret 
via the inequality operator and returns the comparison result. 
4.6.4 Hadoop Job Obfuscation 
A Hadoop job is usually packaged into a .jar file, which contains multiple Java .class 
files. CAMR can directly obfuscate .class files. However, if we directly feed a .class file 
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from a Hadoop job into Soot to perform analysis, Soot will throw an exception. This is 
because each .class file references Hadoop framework classes and functions, which Soot 
cannot find. However, feeding the entire Hadoop framework into Soot is infeasible given 
the complexity of the Hadoop implementation. In this case, we only need to generate stub 
Hadoop framework classes and functions, which will be referenced by the job’s .class files 
when performing RCFO. At runtime, the transformed job will reference the real 
framework classes and functions. Because the number of referenced framework classes 
and functions are limited and the implementation of the stub functions is trivial, such work 
can be done quickly and can be reused for all Hadoop jobs. For example, our 
implementation generates 1,502 lines of Java code, which covers all the classes and 
functions referenced in our experiments. 
During obfuscation, we put the Hadoop framework stub files together with the original 
job .class files to perform program analysis and transformation. After obfuscation, we 
generate the job .jar file based on the transformed job .class files. 
4.6.5 CFQ Function Encryption 
We implemented a lightweight CFQ function encryption using the Java standard 
encryption library. We will leave the full-fledged implementation to future work. To 
implement CFQ function encryption, we generate Ksym in step 1 of Figure 23 through the 
Java random number generator and SHA-1 hash algorithm. We use RSA to implement the 
asymmetric key encryption scheme, which is performed in steps 0, 2 and 3. Each private 
CFQ function invocation (steps 4, 5 and 6) is encrypted with the symmetric encryption 
scheme AES. Because Ksym never leaks, all private CFQ function invocations in a task can 
share one Ksym. Therefore, the CFQ function encryption key establishment is only 
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performed once for each MapReduce task at the beginning of the task execution. 
4.6.6 Loop Transformation 
We perform the loop transformation technique on loops that contain a constant number 
of iterations. For each transformation, we choose the transformation parameters according 
to LTPG algorithm in Section 4.4.5. We first generate a random positive number Δ. For the 
constant loop iteration number n, we generate a random number U such that 
Δ×(n+1)>U>n×Δ. To generate j0, we insert a function call func(var), which receives a 
non-zero numeric value as the argument and returns a value j0>U. If there is no variable 
defined before the loop, we generate a random number and feed it to func(var). In the 
prototype implementation, we implemented func(var) straightforwardly. It can be replaced 
with other more complicated implementations. In our implementation of func(var), it first 
converts var into a number greater than 1: if var is a negative number, we update it by 
negating it; if the absolute value of var is smaller than 1, we update it with its reciprocal. 
After that, we keep on updating its value by performing square operations on the latest 
value, until the resulting value is greater than U. We return the final result as j0. With the 
value of n and the selected U and Δ, we generate a random number K between U×(n-1) and 
(U-Δ)×n. With the generated parameters, we transform the original loop according to 
Figure 24 d). 
4.6.7 Obfuscation Case Study 
To give readers an intuition about CAMR and RCFO, we show an obfuscation of the 
function addKey in the class SortGenMapper of the TeraGen application in Figure 25. The 
TeraGen application is available with Hadoop 0.20.205 (see TABLE 10). Here, we set the 
obfuscation degree to 0.5. We present the obfuscated public program in the format of 
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grimp, a representation of Java programs that is closer to the Java byte code. Notice that, in 
the grimp representation, the loop statements, such as for and while, are represented as 
more primitive statements, such as if and goto. According to Figure 25, each branch 
statement predicate is transformed into CFQ function invocation CFQ(predicate 
expression, call site identifier). Here, we simplify the call site identifier as a number rather 
than the universal format just for clarity.  
 
 
//Original Function 
private void addKey() { 
    for(int i=0; i<3; i++) { 
        long temp = rand.next() / 52; 
        keyBytes[3 + 4*i] = (byte) (' ' + (temp % 95)); 
        temp /= 95; 
        keyBytes[2 + 4*i] = (byte) (' ' + (temp % 95)); 
        temp /= 95; 
        keyBytes[1 + 4*i] = (byte) (' ' + (temp % 95)); 
        temp /= 95; 
        keyBytes[4*i] = (byte) (' ' + (temp % 95)); 
      } 
      key.set(keyBytes, 0, 10); 
} 
 
 
 
//Obfuscated Function, Grimp format 
private void addKey(){ 
        org.apache.hadoop.examples.terasort.TeraGen$SortGenMapper r0; 
        int i0, i1, i2; 
        long l3, l11, l18, l25; 
        r0 := @this; 
     // Loop step generation 
        i0 = r0.func((int) (java.lang.Math.random() * 100.0)); 
        i1 = 0; 
        goto label2; 
     label0: 
        if CFQ(i0 + -1.0 * 168, 123) goto label1; 
     label1: 
        i0 = i0 + -50; 
     label2: 
        if CFQ(i0 + -1.0 * 172, 124) goto label0; 
     // End of loop step generation 
        i2 = 0; 
        if CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 187, 125) goto label3; 
     // start of original loop 
     label3: 
        goto label13; 
     label4: 
        if CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 189, 126) goto label5; 
     label5: 
        l3 = r0.rand.next() / 52L; 
        if CFQ(-1.0 * i2 + 406, 127) goto label6; 
     label6: 
        r0.keyBytes[3 + 4 * i1] = (byte) (int) (32L + l3 % 95L); 
        if !CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 184, 128) goto label5; 
     label7: 
  115
        l11 = l3 / 95L; 
        r0.keyBytes[2 + 4 * i1] = (byte) (int) (32L + l11 % 95L); 
        if CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 192, 129) goto label8; 
     label8: 
        l18 = l11 / 95L; 
        if !CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 194, 130) goto label10; 
     label9: 
        r0.keyBytes[1 + 4 * i1] = (byte) (int) (32L + l18 % 95L); 
        if CFQ(-1.0 * i2 + 404, 131) goto label10; 
     label10: 
        l25 = l18 / 95L; 
        if CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 191, 132) goto label11; 
     label11: 
        r0.keyBytes[4 * i1] = (byte) (int) (32L + l25 % 95L); 
        i2 = i2 + i0; 
        if !CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 191, 133) goto label9; 
     label12: 
        i1 = i1 + 1; 
     label13: 
        if CFQ(-1.0 * i2 + 393, 134) goto label4; 
     //End of original loop 
        if !CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 191, 135) goto label11; 
     label14: 
        r0.key.set(r0.keyBytes, 0, 10); 
        if !CFQ(-1.0 * i0 + 192, 136) goto label4; 
     label15: 
        return; 
} 
Figure 25 Obfuscation of SortGenMapper.addKey in TeraGen job 
Figure 25 shows that the loop transformation is firstly performed on the original for loop. 
CAMR generates the random numbers K, U and Δ as 380, 180 and 50, respectively, to 
satisfy formulas (1) through (5). Because there is no variable available before the 
transformed loop, we generate a random number that is between 0 and 100 and feed it as an 
argument to the invocation of func(var). Based on the argument var, the function func(var) 
generates a number j0 >U. The step generation loop starts from the beginning of the 
function and ends after label2. It initializes the loop step i0 by invoking the function 
func(var) (i.e., j0) and continues decreasing i0 by 50 (Δ) until i0 is smaller than 180 (U). 
The resulting i0 is the main loop increasing step. RCFO transforms the main loop (from 
label3 to label13) by making it increase the loop variable i2 by the loop step (i0) repeatedly 
until i2 exceeds K (in label13). The loop condition is transformed to CFQ function 
invocations to hide the transformation parameters K, U and Δ. In addition, CAMR inserts 
eleven fake branch statements to function addKey, and they are marked in italic font. 
Those fake branch statements complicate the control flow graph and make it difficult for 
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the attacker to distinguish original branch statements from fake branch statements. 
4.7 Experiments 
We performed a series of experiments to evaluate CAMR. Our experiments were 
launched on EMR. In EMR, the customer sets up a MapReduce cluster consisting of 
multiple EC2 instances and uploads the MapReduce job and the job input onto the Amazon 
public cloud. The MapReduce job is executed on the cluster, and the job result is stored on 
the public cloud. The detailed use case can be found in Figure 14. We used such an EMR 
service as a baseline and compared it against CAMR. CAMR requires a similar workflow. 
The difference is that the user has to perform RCFO on the MapReduce job and upload the 
public program onto the public cloud. In addition, the user needs to upload the private 
program onto the private cloud. The entire MapReduce job is executed via the coordination 
of the public program on EMR and the private program on the private cloud.  
In our experiments, we used Hadoop 0.20.205.0 on EMR and set up different clusters for 
different experiment sets. We deployed the private cloud on a local Linux server, which 
was configured with a 2.93 GHz 8-core Intel Xeon CPU and 16 GiB of RAM. Because the 
security of RCFO was analyzed in Section 4.5, in this section, we only focus on the 
performance evaluation. We define the performance overhead as the percentage of the 
extra execution time incurred in CAMR, compared with the baseline. We measured the 
performance overhead in two sets of experiments. In the first set, we launched the 
performance test. We chose four Hadoop applications and observed the performance 
overhead by changing the obfuscation degree d. In the second set of experiments, we 
performed the scalability test. We chose three Hadoop applications from the previous 
experiment set, increased the computation load, and observed the changing trend of the 
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performance overhead. For the same Hadoop application with the same configuration, we 
repeated the job execution ten times and recorded the average execution time. 
4.7.1 Performance Test 
To launch the performance test, we set up an EMR cluster on the Amazon public cloud 
that consists of one small EC2 instance as the master and two small EC2 instances as 
workers (each small EC2 instance was configured to have one vCPU, 1.7 GiB of memory 
and 160 GB of storage). We set up the private cloud on a local Linux server, which was 
configured with a 2.93 GHz 8-core Intel Xeon CPU and 16 GiB of RAM. We chose four 
applications released for Hadoop framework 0.20.205, obfuscated the application with the 
obfuscation degrees 0, 0.5 and 1.0, and measured the performance overhead.  
Job 
Name Description Parameters and Input Settings 
Word 
Count 
Count the occurrence of each word in the input 
text files. 
100 text files downloaded from free ebook 
project website Gutenberg[27]. The total 
data size is 78 MB. 
Pi Compute the value of Pi with the Monte-Carlo method. 
Generate 104 samples to calculate the value 
of Pi. Each task generates 1,000 samples. 
TeraGen Generate random text strings that can be used for sorting. Randomly generate 10
6 text records. 
TeraSort Sort text strings in alphabetical order. Sort the 106 records generated by TeraGen. 
TABLE 10 Hadoop Jobs Used in the Experiments 
The Hadoop applications used in this set of experiments are listed in TABLE 10. The 
results show that CAMR is able to obfuscate all four jobs. The execution time and the 
performance overhead of the four applications are shown in Figure 26.  
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Figure 26 Execution Times of MapReduce Jobs with Different Obfuscation Degree d 
According to Figure 26, the performance overhead increases with the increase of the 
obfuscation degree d. However, for each job, the performance overhead is modest, even 
when d is increased to 1.0. According to the figure, when the obfuscation degree d is 
increased from 0 to 1.0, the performance overhead increases from 5.4% to 10.6% for Word 
Count, stays at 14.6% for Pi, increases from 15.8% to 62.6% for TeraGen, and increases 
from 23.8% to 44.9% for TeraSort. The results also show that CAMR incurs moderate 
performance overhead, even if the obfuscation degree d is set to 1.0, i.e., we insert a fake 
branch statement before each insertion candidate. We believe that the continuous cache 
effectively reduces the number of private CFQ function invocations and therefore reduces 
the performance overhead. To confirm our belief, we also counted the number of public 
and private CFQ function invocations in the above four jobs. For each job, we counted the 
number of public and private CFQ function calls in each map or reduce task and computed 
the average number for map tasks and reduce tasks, respectively. Because TeraGen and 
TeraSort do not invoke CFQ functions in their reduce tasks, we only counted the 
invocations in their map tasks. The average numbers of invocations and the cache-hit rates 
are shown in TABLE 11.  
Job Name M/R d=0 d=0.5 d=1.0 
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pub priv
cache 
hit  
rate(%)
pub priv
cache 
hit 
rate(%)
pub priv 
cache 
hit 
rate(%)
Word Count 
M 1.27E+6 6 99.9996 2.55E+6 13 99.9995 3.84E+6 18 99.9995
R 3.04E+6 3 99.9999 6.08E+6 6 99.9999 1.03E+7 10 99.9999
Pi 
M 1.55E+4 96 99.3806 4.26E+4 138 99.6761 6.31E+4 170 99.7306
R 105 10 90.4762 116 10 91.3793 197 17 91.3706
TeraGen M 7.50E+6 71 99.9991 1.80E+7 172 99.9990 3.90E+7 396 99.9990
TeraSort M 1.50E+6 9 99.9994 2.00E+6 16 99.9992 4.00E+6 24 99.9994
TABLE 11 CFQ Function Invocation Statistics and Cache-hit Rates 
The results show that the continuous cache greatly reduces the private CFQ function 
invocations and therefore reduces the cross-cloud network communication. For instance, in 
Word Count, when the obfuscation degree is 1.0, the average number of public CFQ 
function invocations in a map task is 3.84E+6, while the average number of private CFQ 
function invocations for each map task is only 18. The cache-hit rate in this setting reaches 
99.9995%. TABLE 11 shows that the cache-hit rate stays above 90% for all experiments 
we performed. In the six different MapReduce tasks, five out of six tasks achieve more than 
99% cache-hit rates. 
4.7.2 Scalability Test 
We observed that the performance overhead changes when the job computation load 
scales up. To speed up the experiment, we set up an EMR cluster consisting of one small 
EC2 instance running as master and four medium EC2 instances running as workers (each 
medium instance was configured with one vCPU, 3.75 GiB of memory and 410 GB of 
storage.). We continued to use the same private cloud configuration. In this set of 
experiments, we set d as 0.5 and used three applications: Word Count, Pi and TeraSort. For 
Word Count, we increased the computation load linearly. For Pi and TeraSort, we 
increased the computation load exponentially. All three applications showed no significant 
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performance overhead increase when the computation load scaled up.  
For Word Count, we generated the job input with RandomTextWriter, a MapReduce job 
released in Hadoop 0.20.205. We linearly increased the job input size from 4 GB to 20 GB. 
Accordingly, the number of map tasks increased linearly. The execution time and the 
performance overhead are shown in TABLE 12.  
Input Data 
Size 
Map Task 
Number 
Baseline Execution 
Time (s) 
CAMR Execution 
Time (s) (d=0.5) 
Performance 
overhead 
4 GB 136 566 628 11.02% 
8 GB 272 1019 1136 11.45% 
12 GB 408 1518 1705 12.32% 
16 GB 544 2010 2288 13.83% 
20 GB 680 2476 2781 12.33% 
TABLE 12 Scalability Test with Word Count 
The results show that, when the input size increases from 4 GB to 20 GB, the 
performance overhead remains between 11.02% and 13.83%. We observe that the 
performance overhead increases slightly when the input data size grows from 4 GB to 16 
GB. However, we also observe a performance overhead drop when the input data size 
increases from 16 GB to 20 GB. Hence, it is possible that the performance overhead 
increase from 4 GB to 16 GB is merely a reflection of the experiment’s randomness. In 
general, no significant performance overhead increase is observed when the input data size 
grows linearly from 4 GB to 20 GB. 
We further increased the computation load growth step to observe the change in 
performance overhead. This time, we used Pi and TeraSort and exponentially increased the 
computation load. 
For Pi, we continued to set each map task to generate 1,000 samples. However, we 
increased the map task number from 10 to 10,000. By increasing the number of map tasks, 
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the job was able to take more samples to evaluate the value of Pi and was therefore able to 
generate a more accurate Pi value. We collected the execution time for each job and 
computed the average execution time for each type of job. The average execution time and 
the performance overhead are shown in TABLE 13.  
Total Sample 
Number 
Map Task 
Number 
Baseline Execution 
Time (s) 
CAMR Execution 
Time (s) (d=0.5) 
Performance 
Overhead 
104 10 56 63 12.57% 
105 100 125 134 7.20% 
106 1000 831 890 7.10% 
107 10000 7812 8537 9.28% 
TABLE 13 Scalability Test with Pi 
These results show that when the number of map tasks is increased from 10 to 100, the 
CAMR incurs less performance overhead; i.e., the performance overhead drops from 12.57% 
to 7.20%. When the number of map tasks scales up from 100 to 1,000, the performance 
overhead is stable at 7.10%. When the number of map tasks scales up to 10,000, the 
performance overhead increases slightly to 9.28%. These results indicate that when the 
computation load exponentially increases, the CAMR does not incur significant increases 
in performance overhead. 
For TeraSort, we exponentially increased the job input size. Specifically, we used 
TeraGen to generate input data containing 10 MB, 100 MB, 1 GB and 20 GB of records. 
Because each record requires 100 bytes, the input data sizes scaled up from 1 GB to 200 
GB. The average execution times for the different input data sizes are shown in TABLE 14. 
When the input data size is 1 GB, the performance overhead of the CAMR is 22.22%. 
When the input data size scales up to 10 GB, the performance overhead drops to 5.45%. 
When the input data size further scales up, the performance overhead decreases slowly 
from 4.76% to 3.59%. The performance overhead changes are similar to those for Pi; when 
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the input data size scales up, CAMR does not incur significant increases in performance 
overhead. 
Input 
Data Size 
Map Task 
Number 
Baseline Execution 
Time (s) 
CAMR Execution 
Time (s) (d=0.5) 
Performance 
Overhead 
1 GB 16 108 132 22.22% 
10 GB 80 716 755 5.45% 
100 GB 752 7353 7703 4.76% 
200 GB 1504 15415 15968 3.59% 
TABLE 14 Scalability Test with TeraSort 
4.7.3 Discussion 
In summary, the experimental results show that the CAMR incurs modest performance 
overhead. Overall, for the same job, higher obfuscation degree values incur greater 
performance overheads. However, in the four applications that we tested, the performance 
overhead increases modestly even if the obfuscation degree increases to 100%. With the 
same obfuscation degree, when the job computation load is scaled up, the performance 
overhead does not significantly increase. Our experiments also show an interesting fact: 
When the computation load is exponentially scaled up, the performance overhead drops to 
a lower value and remains stable afterwards. This fact can potentially be explained as 
follows: when the computation load is small, establishing the communication connection 
for the private CFQ function call occupies a greater percentage of the overall job execution 
time. When the computation load is scaled up, the number of private CFQ function calls is 
also scaled up. Hence, the time used for the connection set up is amortized in the vast 
number of private CFQ function invocations.  
We believe that we can further reduce the performance overhead by optimizing our 
implementation. Our current implementation requires each task to maintain a continuous 
cache that cannot be reused by other tasks. Different tasks have to call the private CFQ 
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function independently, even if the CFQ function call site and parameters are the same. In 
reality, all map (or reduce) tasks in a job execute the same code and can therefore share the 
continuous cache. By centrally managing the continuous cache on the master, we can 
expect a lower number of private CFQ function invocations when the task number scales 
up. This implementation requires a modification of the Hadoop framework. We were 
unable to realize this modification in our EMR-based experiments because EMR does not 
support the customized Hadoop framework. We expect this modification to be 
implemented via the collaboration of public cloud vendors. 
4.8 Related Work 
The confidentiality of cloud computing can be divided into two categories: The data 
confidentiality and the algorithmic confidentiality. The former problem is about how to 
protect the data manipulated in the computation program. The latter problem is about how 
to protect the algorithm of computation program. We discuss the related works for the two 
problems respectively. 
Researchers have proposed a number of solutions to address the data confidentiality 
problem. Some researchers worked on encryption-based solutions for certain frequently 
used data operation such as SQL query [13], JOIN [12], SUM and AVG [14]. On the other 
hand, some researchers were seeking generalized solutions. For MapReduce computation, 
the Airavat platform [11] incorporates differential privacy mechanisms into the 
MapReduce execution framework by automatically adding noise to the output data. Such a 
class of solutions protects the privacy with the cost of losing result accuracy. Alternatively, 
Zhang et al. proposed the Sedic system [10] to use hybrids cloud architecture on the 
MapReduce computation. It pre-labels the input data and directs the sensitive input and 
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sensitive intermediate data to the trusted private cloud and finally merges the sensitive and 
the non-sensitive data on the private cloud.  
Solutions toward algorithmic confidentiality problem lay in the direction of program 
obfuscation, a protection technique to make code unintelligible to reverse engineering 
attacks and thereby to hide the algorithm details. However, a generalized obfuscation 
solution is still lacking due to the great challenge of this problem.  
Indeed, the study of Barak et al. [21] noted that every obfuscator will fail to completely 
obfuscate some programs. Garg et al. [66] proposed the first candidate cryptographic 
construction for a general-purpose obfuscator, an indistinguishable obfuscation scheme 
that can obfuscate all polynomial-size, log-depth circuit (i.e., NC1). Many theoretical 
works followed this direction to explore new schemes [80][82] or improve the 
performance of existing solutions [81]. However, to this point, all such works are still 
limited in theoretical studies. The performance of such class of schemes is far from 
practical.  
Another school tires to seek practical solutions that make the program transformation 
difficult rather than impossible to reverse engineer. Since the control flow, which decides 
the sequence of instructions to be executed, directly reflects the algorithm of a program, 
many researchers proposed solutions to obfuscate the program control flow. Our work falls 
in this direction. 
Wang et al. [16] proposed a control-flow flattening technique that makes all basic blocks 
appear to have the same set of predecessors and successors. The actual control flow during 
execution is dynamically determined. The authors proved that the combination of control 
flow flattening and pointer alias construction makes the static analysis of the obfuscated 
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control flow a NP-complete problem. However, their obfuscation work cannot defend 
against dynamic analysis attacks. Udupa et al. [50] showed that in practice, Wang’s 
obfuscation can be defeated by a simple combination of static and dynamic analysis.  
Collberg et al. [51] proposed to construct opaque predicates to impede the control flow 
de-obfuscation. An opaque predicate is a conditional expression whose value is known to 
the obfuscator, but is difficult for an adversary to deduce statically. Following Collberg’s 
work, several variants of the opaque predicate construction method were proposed to 
construct dynamic opaque predicates. [52] and [53] proposed dynamic and distributed 
opaque predicates, where values of the predicates can only be evaluated at runtime. To 
some extents, our obfuscation approach is inspired by opaque predicates. However, we 
construct the opaqueness by retrieving predicate secrets and hide them in the trusted 
private cloud. In addition, our solution (continuous cache) can limit the performance 
overhead to a more modest range. 
Monirul et al. [54] proposed a control flow obfuscation technique that encrypts the code 
of specific trigger-based behavior with the trigger condition value and changes the trigger 
condition into the format that compares the hash value of variable expressions with a 
certain value. This method is effective in concealing trigger-based behaviors. However, 
because this technique can only handle the “equal” and “not equal” condition predicates, it 
is not suitable for generalized control flow obfuscation. 
Wang et al. [55] proposed a linear obfuscation method that introduces unsolved 
mathematical conjectures into branch conditions to increase the difficulty of reasoning 
about the branch conditions using symbolic execution. However, the authors did not 
demonstrate the security of this approach against other analysis techniques. Additional, 
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their method can be defeated by pattern matching because the number of known 
conjectures is limited. 
The above works enable the attacker to observe the entire program statically and 
dynamically and therefore provide the attacker the possibility of reverse engineering the 
control flow. Our work hides part of the control flow from the attacker and therefore 
increases the difficulty of reverse engineering attacks. 
Ge et al. [15] worked at the executable binary level and proposed the extraction of the 
control flow into an independent process that can be deployed in a trusted environment. 
Their idea of hiding control branch information within the trusted entity is similar to ours. 
However, their control flow information is stored in a jump table, which can only record 
the static block predecessor-successor relationship and cannot handle dynamically 
computed control flow transfers. Additionally, their work involves a significant 
performance overhead. When two processes are executed on a single machine, and the 
shuffle rate is set to 5% (i.e., 5% of the control flow is hidden in the monitor process), their 
system incurs a 108% to 337% performance overhead. When the shuffle rate is 20%, their 
system incurs a 277% to 887% performance overhead.  
4.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we proposed Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce (CAMR), a hybrid 
cloud-based MapReduce framework to protect the control flow confidentiality. The 
CAMR framework performs the Runtime Control Flow Obfuscation technique to 
transform the original program into a public program and a private program, which will be 
deployed to the public cloud and the private cloud, respectively. The transformation keeps 
most original computation on the public program, and maintains the control flow 
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information on the private cloud to protect the control flow confidentiality. We 
implemented a prototype system and deployed it onto a real hybrid cloud environment. Our 
security analysis shows that CAMR can defeat static analysis-based reverse engineering 
attacks and raises the bar for dynamic analysis-based reverse engineering attacks. Our 
experimental results show that CAMR incurs modest performance overhead on each 
MapReduce jobs that we tested. Our work is published in a peer-reviewed journal [65]. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
We claim that even though CAMR and IAMR both focus on MapReduce computation, 
the techniques proposed in the two systems can be generalized to a wide class of 
outsourced computing scenarios. We will discuss the possible directions to extend our 
proposed techniques and their potential problems. 
5.1 Integrity Assurance MapReduce 
The result checking technique proposed in Chapter 3 can be applied to many other 
outsourced computing applications as long as that application complies with the 
assumption that we made in Section 3.3. We list several possible scenarios where the result 
checking technique can be applied. 
1. Volunteer computing.  
Volunteer computing is a type of distributed computing in which computer owners 
donate their computing resources (such as processing power and storage) to finish a certain 
big computing job. For example, the SETI@home project [37] utilizes the computing 
power of volunteer computers to perform observational analysis to detect intelligent life 
outside of Earth. Since anyone can contribute to the computation, malicious participant can 
also offer incorrect results to compromise the accuracy of the computation. For example, it 
has been reported that the SETI@Home project suffered from cheating behaviors from 
malicious volunteers who fake the number of work units completed in order to gain higher 
ranking on the website list of top donators [40]. 
Since tasks in volunteer computing are highly paralleled, the result checking technique 
presented in Section 3.4.1 can be performed on volunteer computing tasks. 
 
  129
2. Crowd computing 
Crowd computing leverages the power of people on the Internet to complete tasks that 
are hard for individual users or computers to do alone. In this computing paradigm, the 
computing outsourcer categorizes similar tasks into batches and assigns tasks to humans on 
the Internet, which we call workers, to solve. The computing outsourcer receives task 
results from workers and pays each worker based on the returned tasks. Since crowd 
computing workers are rewarded according to their returned tasks, malicious workers may 
return trivial incorrect results to expedite their progress, and thereby to earn more money. 
Since tasks in crowd computing are highly parallel, we can also apply the result checking 
technique presented in Section 3.4.1 to achieve high result integrity. 
5.2 Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce 
The Runtime Control Flow Obfuscation (RCFO) technique proposed in Chapter 4 is a 
generalized technique that can be applied to most programing languages that support 
branch statement and network programming. For those programming languages, we can 
extract branch statement predicates, transform them with RCFO and deploy the 
transformed public programs and private programs onto the public cloud and private cloud, 
respectively. 
One advantage of CAMR is that the program transformation does not need source code. 
For example, we can perform program analysis and transformations on java .class files by 
using Soot. To apply RCFO on other programs written with other programing languages, a 
similar tool that works on other programing languages is needed. 
CAMR incurs modest performance overhead. It is because in CAMR, only the map and 
reduce functions in the job are obfuscated. The MapReduce framework is not obfuscated. 
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In other words, cross-cloud Control Flow Query invocation is performed only when the 
map and the reduce functions are invoked, which can greatly mitigate the performance 
delay. If we apply RCFO on other outsourced programs, protecting the entire program may 
incur high performance overhead. We may need to extract algorithmic-critical functions 
and apply RCFO on those functions only. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, we addressed two security problems for the cloud-based MapReduce 
service: the result integrity problem and the algorithmic confidentiality problem. We 
proposed a unified architecture, the hybrid cloud architecture, to address the two problems 
and proposed separate solutions. The principle of our solutions is to leverage the 
trustworthiness of the private cloud to retain the security at the cloud user’s hand, 
meanwhile outsourcing majority computation to the public cloud. 
To address the result integrity problem, we proposed the Integrity Assurance 
MapReduce (IAMR) framework to guarantee high result integrity of MapReduce 
computation, even if the computation is executed on a public cloud that contains malicious 
computing nodes. IAMR performs the result checking technique to reduce the job error 
rate. Specifically, the result checking technique performs probabilistic task/sub-task 
replication on the public cloud, performs probabilistic task/sub-task verification on the 
private cloud, and maintains a trust management mechanism for each worker to ensure the 
participating computing node are benign. We modeled the IAMR and the attacker as a 
two-player zero sum game and proposed two algorithms, the Interactive Gradient Descent 
(IGD) algorithm and the Tiered Interactive Gradient Descent (TIGD) algorithm, to search 
for optimal parameter values that can achieve lowest job error rate upper bound. The IGD 
algorithm can find the parameter settings for IAMR based on the user’s accuracy 
requirement. The TIGD algorithm can find the parameter settings not only based on the 
user’s accuracy requirement, but also on user’s system restriction setting. Our theoretical 
analysis showed that our solution can guarantee a very low job error rate. For example, 
when we set the batch size as 50 and the replication probability as 0.5, we can guarantee 
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less than 1% of job error rate when half of workers on the public cloud are malicious. We 
implemented a prototype system for a real hybrid cloud environment (a hybrid cloud 
consisting of a local private cloud and Amazon EC2) and performed a series of 
experiments to evaluate its performance. Our experimental results showed that IAMR can 
guarantee a low job error rate and incurs moderate performance overhead. For instance, it 
incurs 19% to 83% of delay in the map phase and 29% of delay on in the reduce phase. 
To address the algorithmic confidentiality problem, we focused on protecting the control 
flow confidentiality and proposed the Confidentiality Assurance MapReduce (CAMR) 
platform. We proposed a novel control flow obfuscation technique called Runtime Control 
Flow Obfuscation (RCFO) to hide information on program predicates and complicate the 
control flow graph. To further protect the control flow, RCFO also performs the fake 
branch statements insertion method, the CFQ function encryption scheme and the loop 
transformation technique to further raise the bar for reverse engineering attacks. To reduce 
the performance overhead, RCFO maintains a continuous cache to reduce the cross-cloud 
CFQ function invocation. We developed a prototype system for a real hybrid cloud 
environment (a hybrid cloud consisting of a local private cloud and Amazon EMR). Our 
system can apply RCFO on MapReduce job programs and run the obfuscated job on the 
public cloud. Our experimental results show that the average performance overhead ranges 
from 14.9% to 33.2% when the obfuscation degree increases from 0 to 1.0. 
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